Tuesday, October 30, 2012
Excellent comment by 'Anonymous'
In response to this post on 'Camping after the SHTF' 'Anonymous' has left what I thought was a useful and educational response:
I realize this post is about 3 weeks old, and maybe this comment won't be read, but I couldn't help saying that your post brought to mind my studies of the Nez Perce war. Chased by General Howard, and later Col./Gen. Miles of the U.S. Army, 800 men, women and children (only about 200 of which were warriors) engaged 2,000 soldiers in a fighting retreat of 1,170 miles from June-October of 1877. They fought 4 major battles and multiple other serious engagements. Yet this band, with old men and women among their group and not enough horses, nonetheless had the ability to move, camp and fight effectively. They were surprised in the Clearwater by militia, who did not fare well; the militia were decimated, although roughly half of the tribe's camp was destroyed or abandoned in the battle and subsequent retreat. Later on, the chiefs struggled with varying ideas about how to continue, with the idea by some that their early successes had dissuaded the Army from further pursuing them. They thus felt "safe" when they camped in Big Hole, where General Howard caught them again. That battle carried heavy casualties on both sides, but was disastrous for Howard's soldiers, who had to withdraw. Many of these engagements were "victories" for the Nez Perce because they employed many of the disciplines you outlined in your post, particularly the use of scouts, back-tracking and snap ambushes.
Anyway, I just wanted to share that, and to commend your post and your site.
I realize this post is about 3 weeks old, and maybe this comment won't be read, but I couldn't help saying that your post brought to mind my studies of the Nez Perce war. Chased by General Howard, and later Col./Gen. Miles of the U.S. Army, 800 men, women and children (only about 200 of which were warriors) engaged 2,000 soldiers in a fighting retreat of 1,170 miles from June-October of 1877. They fought 4 major battles and multiple other serious engagements. Yet this band, with old men and women among their group and not enough horses, nonetheless had the ability to move, camp and fight effectively. They were surprised in the Clearwater by militia, who did not fare well; the militia were decimated, although roughly half of the tribe's camp was destroyed or abandoned in the battle and subsequent retreat. Later on, the chiefs struggled with varying ideas about how to continue, with the idea by some that their early successes had dissuaded the Army from further pursuing them. They thus felt "safe" when they camped in Big Hole, where General Howard caught them again. That battle carried heavy casualties on both sides, but was disastrous for Howard's soldiers, who had to withdraw. Many of these engagements were "victories" for the Nez Perce because they employed many of the disciplines you outlined in your post, particularly the use of scouts, back-tracking and snap ambushes.
Anyway, I just wanted to share that, and to commend your post and your site.
Sunday, October 28, 2012
Impending 'Frankenstorm'
We live in Northern Virginia, so we are facing the approach of the 'Frankenstorm' this Monday around lunchtime.
I can't help but think of the potential for this storm to have unforseen effects.
On the one hand, it could just blow through, causing a few outages, no harm no foul.
On the other, it could cause mass chaos and evacuations. I am hearing about evacuation of New York. There are predicted power outages going on for weeks. The election is approaching. There may be a whole load of grumpy people without power. There may be those that are unable to vote. Whichever way the election goes, some could feel cheated. Would the election be delayed?
On the back of the potential impact of this storm, we could see increasd likelihood of the fears that the election results could cause rioting.
Who knows where this goes, it just feels that we may potentially be experienceing one of those convergences of circumstances. The sum is greater than the whole etc....The straw that broke the camels back?
Or it may be over by Wednesday......
I can't help but think of the potential for this storm to have unforseen effects.
On the one hand, it could just blow through, causing a few outages, no harm no foul.
On the other, it could cause mass chaos and evacuations. I am hearing about evacuation of New York. There are predicted power outages going on for weeks. The election is approaching. There may be a whole load of grumpy people without power. There may be those that are unable to vote. Whichever way the election goes, some could feel cheated. Would the election be delayed?
On the back of the potential impact of this storm, we could see increasd likelihood of the fears that the election results could cause rioting.
Who knows where this goes, it just feels that we may potentially be experienceing one of those convergences of circumstances. The sum is greater than the whole etc....The straw that broke the camels back?
Or it may be over by Wednesday......
Thursday, October 25, 2012
What's really happening in Syria
A very interesting read:
NATO using Al Qaeda rat lines to flood Syria with Foreign Terrorists
So potted history: we support The Mujahideen in Aghanistan to wage proxy was on the USSR, which results in the Taliban and Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan.
Now we support the same Islamist extremist terror forces in Libya and Syria in order to wage proxy war on Iran via its ally Syria....these are the same forces we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Futility is continually doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.
There will be tears before bedtime.
NATO using Al Qaeda rat lines to flood Syria with Foreign Terrorists
So potted history: we support The Mujahideen in Aghanistan to wage proxy was on the USSR, which results in the Taliban and Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan.
Now we support the same Islamist extremist terror forces in Libya and Syria in order to wage proxy war on Iran via its ally Syria....these are the same forces we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Futility is continually doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.
There will be tears before bedtime.
Backdoor Survival Fall Book Giveaway
HERE
The Fall reading list from Backdoor Survival.
There will be an author interview with Max Velocity among others and a book giveaway including 'Contact!'
The Fall reading list from Backdoor Survival.
There will be an author interview with Max Velocity among others and a book giveaway including 'Contact!'
Training synergy with Rally Point LLC 'Assemble on Us'
Max Velocity Tactical is pleased to be teaming up with Rally Point LLC for some training synergy based out of Northern Virginia.
Rally Point LLC Here
Charlie Sellens, the President of Rally Point, is a former Special Deputy US Marshal and US Army Ranger. He has provided executive protection for dignitaries in nearly 90 countries in low to high-risk environments, including Iraq.
He is a certified pistol, rifle, and shotgun instructor and Range Master. He is also a certified Antiterrorist Evasive Driving Instructor, and taught for the US Army’s Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division. He has provided security training in a variety of countries and locations across the US.
Charlie also runs a youtube channel called Assemble on Us with some great episodes on various survival, prepping and tactical topics.
Click her for an episode on 'The Outlaw Josey Wales!'
Rally Point brings some excellent operational and training experience to complement the tactical training offered by Max Velocity Tactical.
We are currently offering weekend training courses covering the TTPs covered in the books 'Contact!' and 'Rapid Fire!' We offer standard packages or can tailor to your needs, location and number of days required.
Charlie and I have both been downrange multiple times and if you have read my books you will know that Max Velocity Tactical has a lot of knowledge, operational and training experience to pass on to you. I enjoyed this quote: "You know that we know what we are doing, cos we aint dead yet!"
I am excited that Charlie brings some excellent skill sets and I would like to highlight in particular his professional close protection background and the ability to offer defensive and offensive driving skills, training you in the counter ambsuh and roadblock skills covered in Contact! and Rapid Fire!
I will be posting details on my website here
Rally Point LLC Here
Charlie Sellens, the President of Rally Point, is a former Special Deputy US Marshal and US Army Ranger. He has provided executive protection for dignitaries in nearly 90 countries in low to high-risk environments, including Iraq.
He is a certified pistol, rifle, and shotgun instructor and Range Master. He is also a certified Antiterrorist Evasive Driving Instructor, and taught for the US Army’s Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division. He has provided security training in a variety of countries and locations across the US.
Charlie also runs a youtube channel called Assemble on Us with some great episodes on various survival, prepping and tactical topics.
Click her for an episode on 'The Outlaw Josey Wales!'
Rally Point brings some excellent operational and training experience to complement the tactical training offered by Max Velocity Tactical.
We are currently offering weekend training courses covering the TTPs covered in the books 'Contact!' and 'Rapid Fire!' We offer standard packages or can tailor to your needs, location and number of days required.
Charlie and I have both been downrange multiple times and if you have read my books you will know that Max Velocity Tactical has a lot of knowledge, operational and training experience to pass on to you. I enjoyed this quote: "You know that we know what we are doing, cos we aint dead yet!"
I am excited that Charlie brings some excellent skill sets and I would like to highlight in particular his professional close protection background and the ability to offer defensive and offensive driving skills, training you in the counter ambsuh and roadblock skills covered in Contact! and Rapid Fire!
I will be posting details on my website here
Monday, October 22, 2012
Combat Lifesaving Procedures (TC3)
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TC3)
I had previously posted this elsewhere on a couple of forums so here it is. Some of it is straight from US Army 68W Combat Medical protocols, some pof it is at the CLS (Combat Lifesaver) level, and there is a bit of opinion thrown in there too.....it is partly excerpted from chapters in Contact and Rapid Fire on Casualties:
Unlike the normal ABC medical protocol that you will have heard about, the combat protocol for trauma situations is H-A-B-C, which puts hemorrhage before Airway, if it is indicated, but still includes circulation for less serious bleeds and IVs. The other big difference is tourniquets: tourniquets used to be considered a tool of last resort. Now they are considered a tool of first resort in a combat environment. The following article does not presume to attempt to give all the answers, but it is a basic summary.
Some procedures that are appropriate in a civilian ambulance situation are not appropriate on the battlefield. Ambulance crews may give fluids to casualties on the way to the hospital, where blood is available. They can, in simple terms, keep putting the fluids in and get definitive care once they arrive at the emergency room. In a battlefield situation, fluids are not given except in specific circumstances. In simple terms, when you go into true shock by losing circulating body fluids (i.e. blood) your blood pressure will drop. As your body responds to the injury and the loss of blood, it will draw blood into the vital organs at the core of the body, at the expense of the limbs. Thus, as blood pressure falls you begin to lose the distal pulses (i.e. in the wrist and foot), then closer and closer to the core until you have no pulses but the heart, and the heart will be the last to give out at the lowest blood pressure. In a combat situation, if you give too much fluid, there is a danger of “blowing the clot” and effectively bleeding out while diluting the blood left in the body, reducing its ability to carry oxygen. Also, fluids frequently given such as Lactated Ringers are rapidly absorbed into tissue so over time they are not really effectively increasing the volume of the blood. Hence the giving of fluids in the ambulance, where in very simple terms you can keep putting it in until you reach the emergency room and blood/plasma products are available. The fluid given for a traumatic wounding on the battlefield is not lactated ringers or similar, but Hextend, which is a starch product. Over roughly an hour, 500cc of Hextend will draw fluids out of surrounding tissue and bulk up to around 800cc. Guidelines state that you can use a maximum of two 500cc bags, 30 minutes apart. The protocol is only to give fluids if there are no radial (or pedal) pulses, which are the pulses in the wrist or foot. The reason is that you want to bring the blood pressure up enough to restore distal circulation to the extremities but no more, because you don’t want to 'blow any clots' or cause the casualty to 'bleed out'. For other injuries such as dehydration other fluids are still given, but not for trauma.
The fact is that a large number of combat injuries are not survivable. Sometimes this will be obvious and the casualty has no chance of survival. Other times, survival will depend on appropriate interventions followed by rapid evacuation and definitive surgical care. There is a difference between being able to keep someone alive at the point of wounding and continuing to keep them alive due to the presence or absence of available definitive care. Do what you can to initially prevent death and get them to someone who can help, or worst case read some books on battlefield surgery and do something yourself, even if it’s just cleaning, debriding and suturing wounds and providing antibiotics, hoping that internal injuries and bleeding are not too severe and will heal in time.
The use of body armor will reduce the incidence of penetrating trauma sustained in combat to the torso and the damage and resulting internal bleeding. Historically, 90% of combat deaths occur before the casualty reaches the treatment facility. The three major, but potentially survivable causes of death on the battlefield are: extremity hemorrhage exsanguination (severe bleeding), tension pneumothorax (oxygen shortage and low blood pressure due to a collapsed lung, a condition that may progress to cardiac arrest if untreated) and airway obstruction. Historically, the most frequent and preventable of these causes of death is extremity bleeding. Most wounds to the extremities will cause death by bleeding out, and this is preventable. Some combat wounds are simply not survivable and will not respond to medical attention i.e. severe internal bleeding or visible brain matter etc.
Care Under Fire:
In this phase the casualty is “on the X” at the point of wounding. This is the point of greatest danger for the CLS. An assessment should be made for signs of life (i.e. is the casualty obviously dead). Cover fire should be given and fire superiority achieved. The casualty should be told, if conscious, to either return fire, apply self-aid, crawl to cover or lay still (don’t tell them to “play dead!”). Once it becomes possible to reach the casualty, the only treatment given in the care under fire phase, if required, is a hasty tourniquet “high and tight” on a limb, over the clothing, in order to prevent extremity bleeding. The casualty should be rapidly moved to cover (drag them).
Tourniquet application: “high and tight” means right up at the top of the leg or arm, right in the groin (inguinal) or armpit (axial) region. The tourniquet needs to be cinched down tight to stop the bleeding. Use/purchase the CAT – Combat Application Tourniquet.
When applying tourniquets, they need to be tight enough to stop the distal pulse i.e. the pulse in the foot or wrist, assuming the limb has not been traumatically amputated. You will not be able to check this pulse at this phase, so just get the tourniquet on tight and check the distal pulse as part of the next phase, tactical field care.
Traumatic amputation: get the tourniquet on high and tight and tighten it until the bleeding stops. Note: in some circumstances there will be pulsating arterial bleeding and severe venous bleeding, but other times it is possible that there may be less bleeding initially as the body reacts in shock and “shuts down” the extremities, but bleeding will resume when the body relaxes. So get that tourniquet on tight.
Compartment Syndrome: you don’t want to be feeling sorry for the casualty and trying to cinch the tourniquet down 'only just enough'. Tighten it to stop the distal pulse. If you don’t, the continuing small amount of blood circulation into the limb can cause compartment syndrome, which is a build-up of toxins: when the tourniquet is removed, these toxins flood into the body and can seriously harm the casualty.
For an improvised tourniquet, make sure the strap is no less than 2 inches wide, to prevent it cutting into the flesh of the limb.
Tactical Field Care:
Once the casualty is no longer “on the X”, CLS can move into the Tactical Field Care phase. This is where the CLS conducts the assessment of the casualty and treats the wounds as best as possible according to H-A-B-C:
Hemorrhage: During the Tactical Field care phase, any serious extremity bleeding (arterial or serious venous) on a limb, including traumatic amputation, is treated with a tourniquet 2-3 inches above the wound. Axial (armpit), inguinal (groin) and neck wounds are treated by packing with Kerlix or combat gauze (treated with hemostatic agent, commercially available from Quickclot) and wrapping up with ACE type bandage.
Once you have dragged the casualty to cover, you will conduct a blood sweep of the neck, axial region, arms, inguinal region and legs. This can be done as a pat down, a “feel” or “claw”, or simply ripping your hands down the limbs. Debate exists as to the best method. Conduct the blood sweep and look at your hands at each stage to see if you have found blood. Once a wound is found, check for exit wounds. Ignore minor bleeds at this stage: you are concerned about pulsating arterial bleeds and any kind of serious bleed where you can see the blood rapidly running out of the body.
Beware of deliberate tourniquet application to the lower limbs, below the knee and elbows. The two small bones there may cause problems, particularly with traumatic amputation, and the tourniquet may either not be effective or cause further harm to the casualty. Assess it. Also, if the injury is, for example, below the knee, then don’t put the tourniquet over a joint (i.e. knee), put it above the joint.
Airway: CLS can aid the airway by positioning (i.e. head tilt/chin lift to open the airway) and use of the NPA. An NPA should be used for any casualty who is unconscious or who otherwise has an altered mental status.
· Consider use of an OPA/NPA and suction. You need to be trained on these items.
· Combat medics are trained to carry out a crycothyroidotomy (“crike”) to place a breathing tube though the front of the airway. This is an effective way of quickly opening the airway on the battlefield, particularly for facial trauma of burns to the face and airway.. If you are trained and have the equipment you can use patent airways that insert into the mouth and are of the types that paramedics are be trained to use: Combi-tubes and King Airways.
· A crike will save life but assumes that you are heading to a hospital for treatment and repair. The tube will go through the membrane and this will need to be repaired. However, if it is your option to save life, do it and figure out the details later.
Breathing: Occlusive (airtight) dressings are used to close any open chest wounds. Check for exit wounds! Check the integrity of the chest: ribs and breast bone. You will have to open body armor to do this. If signs of a pneumo/hemo-thorax develop (progressive respiratory distress, late stages would be a deviated trachea (windpipe) in the neck as a result of the whole lung and heart being pushed to one side by the pressure of the air build up in the chest cavity) then needle chest decompression can be performed (NCD).
· If you don’t have a specific occlusive dressing, use something like plastic (or the pressure dressing packet) and tape it down over the chest wound. The Old school method was to tape three sides to let air escape, current thinking is to tape all four sides down to seal the wound.
· NCD involves placing a 14 gauge needle, at least 3.25 inches long, into the second intercostal rib space (above the third rib) in the mid-clavicular line (nipple line). This is basically a little below the collar bone, in line above the nipple. The needle is withdrawn and the cannula is left open to air (tape it in place). An immediate rush of air out of the chest indicates the presence of a tension pneumothorax. The manoeuver effectively converts a tension pneumothorax into a simple pneumothorax.
o The definitive treatment is to get a chest tube in, in the side of the chest (eighth intercostal space); to drain the blood and air that is filling the chest cavity.
You then move on to Circulation (including bleeds and administering a saline lock or fluids), any pain meds you have and that are appropriate, and then the full assessment, which is not covered in detail here. For wounds that do not need a tourniquet or the tourniquet can be converted, then pack the wound and use something like a pressure bandage/Israeli dressing to stop the bleeding. Once you have treated the H-ABCs and conducted the assessment and any interventions you should cover the casualty with a thermal blanket to retain body heat and reduce the risk of hypothermia. You will continue to monitor the casualty and perform interventions as necessary both prior to and during the evacuation.
I had previously posted this elsewhere on a couple of forums so here it is. Some of it is straight from US Army 68W Combat Medical protocols, some pof it is at the CLS (Combat Lifesaver) level, and there is a bit of opinion thrown in there too.....it is partly excerpted from chapters in Contact and Rapid Fire on Casualties:
Unlike the normal ABC medical protocol that you will have heard about, the combat protocol for trauma situations is H-A-B-C, which puts hemorrhage before Airway, if it is indicated, but still includes circulation for less serious bleeds and IVs. The other big difference is tourniquets: tourniquets used to be considered a tool of last resort. Now they are considered a tool of first resort in a combat environment. The following article does not presume to attempt to give all the answers, but it is a basic summary.
Some procedures that are appropriate in a civilian ambulance situation are not appropriate on the battlefield. Ambulance crews may give fluids to casualties on the way to the hospital, where blood is available. They can, in simple terms, keep putting the fluids in and get definitive care once they arrive at the emergency room. In a battlefield situation, fluids are not given except in specific circumstances. In simple terms, when you go into true shock by losing circulating body fluids (i.e. blood) your blood pressure will drop. As your body responds to the injury and the loss of blood, it will draw blood into the vital organs at the core of the body, at the expense of the limbs. Thus, as blood pressure falls you begin to lose the distal pulses (i.e. in the wrist and foot), then closer and closer to the core until you have no pulses but the heart, and the heart will be the last to give out at the lowest blood pressure. In a combat situation, if you give too much fluid, there is a danger of “blowing the clot” and effectively bleeding out while diluting the blood left in the body, reducing its ability to carry oxygen. Also, fluids frequently given such as Lactated Ringers are rapidly absorbed into tissue so over time they are not really effectively increasing the volume of the blood. Hence the giving of fluids in the ambulance, where in very simple terms you can keep putting it in until you reach the emergency room and blood/plasma products are available. The fluid given for a traumatic wounding on the battlefield is not lactated ringers or similar, but Hextend, which is a starch product. Over roughly an hour, 500cc of Hextend will draw fluids out of surrounding tissue and bulk up to around 800cc. Guidelines state that you can use a maximum of two 500cc bags, 30 minutes apart. The protocol is only to give fluids if there are no radial (or pedal) pulses, which are the pulses in the wrist or foot. The reason is that you want to bring the blood pressure up enough to restore distal circulation to the extremities but no more, because you don’t want to 'blow any clots' or cause the casualty to 'bleed out'. For other injuries such as dehydration other fluids are still given, but not for trauma.
The fact is that a large number of combat injuries are not survivable. Sometimes this will be obvious and the casualty has no chance of survival. Other times, survival will depend on appropriate interventions followed by rapid evacuation and definitive surgical care. There is a difference between being able to keep someone alive at the point of wounding and continuing to keep them alive due to the presence or absence of available definitive care. Do what you can to initially prevent death and get them to someone who can help, or worst case read some books on battlefield surgery and do something yourself, even if it’s just cleaning, debriding and suturing wounds and providing antibiotics, hoping that internal injuries and bleeding are not too severe and will heal in time.
The use of body armor will reduce the incidence of penetrating trauma sustained in combat to the torso and the damage and resulting internal bleeding. Historically, 90% of combat deaths occur before the casualty reaches the treatment facility. The three major, but potentially survivable causes of death on the battlefield are: extremity hemorrhage exsanguination (severe bleeding), tension pneumothorax (oxygen shortage and low blood pressure due to a collapsed lung, a condition that may progress to cardiac arrest if untreated) and airway obstruction. Historically, the most frequent and preventable of these causes of death is extremity bleeding. Most wounds to the extremities will cause death by bleeding out, and this is preventable. Some combat wounds are simply not survivable and will not respond to medical attention i.e. severe internal bleeding or visible brain matter etc.
Care Under Fire:
In this phase the casualty is “on the X” at the point of wounding. This is the point of greatest danger for the CLS. An assessment should be made for signs of life (i.e. is the casualty obviously dead). Cover fire should be given and fire superiority achieved. The casualty should be told, if conscious, to either return fire, apply self-aid, crawl to cover or lay still (don’t tell them to “play dead!”). Once it becomes possible to reach the casualty, the only treatment given in the care under fire phase, if required, is a hasty tourniquet “high and tight” on a limb, over the clothing, in order to prevent extremity bleeding. The casualty should be rapidly moved to cover (drag them).
Tourniquet application: “high and tight” means right up at the top of the leg or arm, right in the groin (inguinal) or armpit (axial) region. The tourniquet needs to be cinched down tight to stop the bleeding. Use/purchase the CAT – Combat Application Tourniquet.
When applying tourniquets, they need to be tight enough to stop the distal pulse i.e. the pulse in the foot or wrist, assuming the limb has not been traumatically amputated. You will not be able to check this pulse at this phase, so just get the tourniquet on tight and check the distal pulse as part of the next phase, tactical field care.
Traumatic amputation: get the tourniquet on high and tight and tighten it until the bleeding stops. Note: in some circumstances there will be pulsating arterial bleeding and severe venous bleeding, but other times it is possible that there may be less bleeding initially as the body reacts in shock and “shuts down” the extremities, but bleeding will resume when the body relaxes. So get that tourniquet on tight.
Compartment Syndrome: you don’t want to be feeling sorry for the casualty and trying to cinch the tourniquet down 'only just enough'. Tighten it to stop the distal pulse. If you don’t, the continuing small amount of blood circulation into the limb can cause compartment syndrome, which is a build-up of toxins: when the tourniquet is removed, these toxins flood into the body and can seriously harm the casualty.
For an improvised tourniquet, make sure the strap is no less than 2 inches wide, to prevent it cutting into the flesh of the limb.
Tactical Field Care:
Once the casualty is no longer “on the X”, CLS can move into the Tactical Field Care phase. This is where the CLS conducts the assessment of the casualty and treats the wounds as best as possible according to H-A-B-C:
Hemorrhage: During the Tactical Field care phase, any serious extremity bleeding (arterial or serious venous) on a limb, including traumatic amputation, is treated with a tourniquet 2-3 inches above the wound. Axial (armpit), inguinal (groin) and neck wounds are treated by packing with Kerlix or combat gauze (treated with hemostatic agent, commercially available from Quickclot) and wrapping up with ACE type bandage.
Once you have dragged the casualty to cover, you will conduct a blood sweep of the neck, axial region, arms, inguinal region and legs. This can be done as a pat down, a “feel” or “claw”, or simply ripping your hands down the limbs. Debate exists as to the best method. Conduct the blood sweep and look at your hands at each stage to see if you have found blood. Once a wound is found, check for exit wounds. Ignore minor bleeds at this stage: you are concerned about pulsating arterial bleeds and any kind of serious bleed where you can see the blood rapidly running out of the body.
Beware of deliberate tourniquet application to the lower limbs, below the knee and elbows. The two small bones there may cause problems, particularly with traumatic amputation, and the tourniquet may either not be effective or cause further harm to the casualty. Assess it. Also, if the injury is, for example, below the knee, then don’t put the tourniquet over a joint (i.e. knee), put it above the joint.
Airway: CLS can aid the airway by positioning (i.e. head tilt/chin lift to open the airway) and use of the NPA. An NPA should be used for any casualty who is unconscious or who otherwise has an altered mental status.
· Consider use of an OPA/NPA and suction. You need to be trained on these items.
· Combat medics are trained to carry out a crycothyroidotomy (“crike”) to place a breathing tube though the front of the airway. This is an effective way of quickly opening the airway on the battlefield, particularly for facial trauma of burns to the face and airway.. If you are trained and have the equipment you can use patent airways that insert into the mouth and are of the types that paramedics are be trained to use: Combi-tubes and King Airways.
· A crike will save life but assumes that you are heading to a hospital for treatment and repair. The tube will go through the membrane and this will need to be repaired. However, if it is your option to save life, do it and figure out the details later.
Breathing: Occlusive (airtight) dressings are used to close any open chest wounds. Check for exit wounds! Check the integrity of the chest: ribs and breast bone. You will have to open body armor to do this. If signs of a pneumo/hemo-thorax develop (progressive respiratory distress, late stages would be a deviated trachea (windpipe) in the neck as a result of the whole lung and heart being pushed to one side by the pressure of the air build up in the chest cavity) then needle chest decompression can be performed (NCD).
· If you don’t have a specific occlusive dressing, use something like plastic (or the pressure dressing packet) and tape it down over the chest wound. The Old school method was to tape three sides to let air escape, current thinking is to tape all four sides down to seal the wound.
· NCD involves placing a 14 gauge needle, at least 3.25 inches long, into the second intercostal rib space (above the third rib) in the mid-clavicular line (nipple line). This is basically a little below the collar bone, in line above the nipple. The needle is withdrawn and the cannula is left open to air (tape it in place). An immediate rush of air out of the chest indicates the presence of a tension pneumothorax. The manoeuver effectively converts a tension pneumothorax into a simple pneumothorax.
o The definitive treatment is to get a chest tube in, in the side of the chest (eighth intercostal space); to drain the blood and air that is filling the chest cavity.
You then move on to Circulation (including bleeds and administering a saline lock or fluids), any pain meds you have and that are appropriate, and then the full assessment, which is not covered in detail here. For wounds that do not need a tourniquet or the tourniquet can be converted, then pack the wound and use something like a pressure bandage/Israeli dressing to stop the bleeding. Once you have treated the H-ABCs and conducted the assessment and any interventions you should cover the casualty with a thermal blanket to retain body heat and reduce the risk of hypothermia. You will continue to monitor the casualty and perform interventions as necessary both prior to and during the evacuation.
A Novel Idea
I have been toying with the idea for a while, but I have taken the plunge and decided to write a novel. The idea will be a work of fiction that will work as a vehicle for bringing in some of the tactical concepts from my non-fiction books Contact and Rapid Fire. I do aspire to the book being more than just a fictional instruction or tactical story though; I hope to make it interesting as a story in its own right.
It is not likely to be easy, and will take me some time to complete. The general concept is a sort of post-collapse resistance to enemies, perhaps foreign or domestic ;-)
I you have any thoughts of any areas you would like illustrated in the book. let me know and I will see if I can weave it into the storyline.
It is not likely to be easy, and will take me some time to complete. The general concept is a sort of post-collapse resistance to enemies, perhaps foreign or domestic ;-)
I you have any thoughts of any areas you would like illustrated in the book. let me know and I will see if I can weave it into the storyline.
Saturday, October 20, 2012
Civil War, Cedar Creek, Virginia, 2012
The program said: 2:30, Cavalry Skirmish. I was expecting some lame thing with a couple of guys riding around. Next, cannon fire erupts from both ridges, skirmish lines move forward, cavalry engage and then I look to my right to see a column of what appears to be the 'entire' Union army approaching, before the two lines of infantry deploy and engage. Excellent stuff.
Tuesday, October 16, 2012
A Tactical Fiction: Patrol Contact!
Here is a little foray into some tactical fiction. The idea is to tell a little story in a fictional setting to bring out some tactical lessons:
A Tactical Fiction: Patrol Contact!
The sixteen man foot patrol had been out for a week now. They were cold, wet and hungry. There were two squads of eight fighters, with a headquarters element of two; the patrol leader and the medic. Yesterday morning they had accomplished their mission, after lying in position overnight to accomplish the ambush of a supply convoy, and they had moved rapidly away before continuing to patrol out on their route through the fall forest. Yesterday afternoon, they had identified a suitable patrol base on the map so that they could rest up and administrate themselves before continuing the extraction. They were not following a trail, but instead they were ‘hand railing’ a small creek, keeping it a hundred meters to their right as they moved. The patrol leader had signaled for a ‘snap ambush’ and they broke track, moving off left at ninety degrees to their trail and then peeling back into a line covering the route they had come. They had not seen any evidence of a tracker, but they took precautions all the same. The patrol leader had taken a small party away and found a suitable patrol base in the deep cover of the trees. A buddy pair returned to the ambush party and led them into the occupation of the base.
The patrol leader had decided to occupy in a linear formation, with the two squads parallel to each other in two lines, Alpha to the north side and Bravo to the south, headquarters between the two squads. There were two sentry posts, one at each end of the line, each squad responsible for one of the posts. The patrol occupied the base in buddy pairs, with four pairs per squad. As part of the ‘work phase’ of the ‘occupation’ each pair dug a ‘shell scrape’, a shallow (twelve inches deep) rectangular hole large enough for two men to sleep in with their rucks. Each pair faced out of the patrol base with sectors of fire allocated by the patrol leader. A track plan was cleared behind the scrapes, with communications cord strung between the trees to allow for hand rail movement at night. A latrine was dug under the watchful eye of one of the sentry positions and each time it was used the fighter would pile a little dirt back in over his leavings, to cover it up and reduce smell.
Once the work phase was complete, the patrol went into routine. They were on ‘hard routine’ after the ambush and this close to the enemy and there was no cooking, but weapons were battle cleaned and food was eaten cold. Socks were changed and feet powdered. Following evening stand to, in the dark, ponchos were put up over the scrapes. Throughout the night the sentry rotation went on. There were always two sentries at night per sentry position. Each man was woken ten minutes before his duty and he would quietly and without use of light put all his gear away in his ruck, save taking down the poncho. All gear not in use was always stowed, in case of the need for rapid movement. In the night it started to rain but by morning the rain had stopped. It was fall, and it was cold out there in the woods with a hint of the coming winter. The rain didn’t help.
Prior to dawn, the sentries woke the patrol for stand to. In the cold pre-dawn the fighters crawled out of their bags and packed their gear away. They took down the ponchos and removed excessive warm clothing, donning their body armor arrayed with their ammunition pouches. It was cold, and some of them shivered uncontrollably as they adjusted to the temperature outside of their sleeping bags. The rain still dripped down out of the trees and the worst part was putting on their cold sweat-damp helmets with wet chinstraps. Before dawn the patrol was silent, laid in their scrapes covering their sectors. There was a light mist on the forest floor, with the rain dripping down out of the trees. Yes, they were cold wet and hungry, but that did not impact their morale. They would bitch and moan, but if they weren’t moaning, that was when you had to worry. They were hardened fighters, with a deep motivation unaffected by the temporary hardships of their situation. Their morale was born of self-discipline, coming from a hard place deep inside, unbreakable.
The sky began to lighten but the dawn was delayed in the deep woods. The fighters shivered in their scrapes and waited for the end of stand to. Bravo squad was covering the sectors to the south, where they had come from the previous day. Loud in the silence came the snap of a twig and they tensed, staring into the lightening forest. Slowly the silhouettes of a skirmish line came into view, maybe fifty meters away, as they came on through the woods. The enemy did not know exactly where they were, but they knew they were in the woods somewhere. As the enemy closed to twenty five meters the Bravo squad leader opened fire, shooting a silhouette in the chest, immediately followed by the rest of his squad opening fire. The gunfire was harsh in the silence of the dawn and several of the enemy skirmish line were immediately hit. The enemy was well drilled and immediately went to ground and started to return fire, the harsh orders of their squad leader competing with the screams of one of his men who had been badly wounded. The firing increased to a crescendo and fire control orders were ringing out on both sides. The enemy managed to bring a SAW in to action on the left flank and high velocity rounds went cracking through the trees in both directions. Luckily for the patrol, they were in hard cover in their scrapes and most of the rounds were passing overhead; they were also able to take advantage of the shock effect their initial weight of fire had on the enemy skirmish line. Some of the enemy had been hit, most were well drilled veterans, but a few had frozen and were not yet responding to calls for rapid fire from the enemy squad leader.
The patrol leader was assessing the situation. Alpha squad was still covering the rear, to the north, in case of an enemy flanking attack. Having been ‘bumped’ by the enemy it was now paramount for the patrol to bug out and extract to the ERV. However, the nominated ERV was to the south and was no longer accessible. The patrol leader was reading the battle and listening to the sounds of the firefight. The ground was generally flat but to the left of Bravo squad was a small depression where the ground sloped away in the beginnings of a draw that ran down to the right flank of the enemy force. It was not a significant feature really, the very beginnings of a creek, but he could anticipate how the enemy platoon leader would see it. He could hear the shouted orders from the remainder of the enemy platoon behind the point squad that was engaged. He gave orders of Alpha squad to move up to the left of Bravo squad. Bravo gave rapid fire and threw smoke while Alpha peeled out from their scrapes and back on to line covering the small draw. Normally they would have bugged out with their rucks but the situation was too serious so they just grabbed their daypacks. From now on, if they got out of this fix, it would be ‘travel light, freeze at night’. Alpha peeled in to the left of Bravo, getting on line. The patrolm leader had the medic observe to the north, just in case. However, he was right in his assessment; the enemy commander had identified the depression as a route to the patrol base and rapidly moved a second squad up to the patrols left, to try and flank and roll up the patrol. As the enemy flanking squad moved through the trees, jogging in single file, they ran into a hail of fire from Alpha on the left side and rapidly took cover, returning sporadic fire from fire positions behind trees as they tried to regain their balance. .
The situation was now the two squads of the patrol facing two enemy squads. The patrol had taken the initiative and inflicted casualties on the enemy. The enemy platoon leader was organizing his reserve squad and relaying the situation back to his Company Commander to the rear. The enemy was gaining momentum, the pressure was going to build, but they would be unable to bring down indirect fire while the two forces were so close. The patrol leader gave shouted orders for the two squads to prepare to break contact. The drill was for each squad to fire and move as fire teams, keeping both squads roughly on line as they moved north back away from the enemy. If they stayed in place, the enemy would roll them up from the flank. They threw smoke to the front, and on orders the whole patrol started a rapid weight of fire to knock the enemy back before beginning to bound back, fire and maneuvering north, away from the enemy. They only had the ammunition they carried, so they slowed the rate of fire to deliberate whenever rapid fire was not called for; they aimed at positively identified enemy or fired steadily into cover where they knew the enemy to be. The enemy platoon leader had by now deployed one of his 240 gun teams up to his left flank and the gunner brought the 7.62 machine gun into action just after the patrol had completed its first couple of bounds back. The deep staccato beat of the gun rang out and the rounds cracked through the trees, tearing off chunks of wood and felling leaves and branches.
Bravo was fire and moving back and as one of the guys bounded back he was hit in the rear ballistic plate and thrown off balance into a face plant, winded. He rolled over and got up, adrenaline pushing him to finish the bound. Another fighter was hit in the thigh as he ran, he leg kicked out from under him as the round smashed his femur and tore open his femoral artery. He went to the ground with bright red arterial blood pumping out of the wound. As his buddy was running back, he grabbed his harness and dragged the wounded man with him on his bound back, the wounded leg bouncing agonizingly on the ground, until he could get him into cover behind a tree. He grabbed the wounded fighters CAT tourniquet and whipped it onto the leg over the BDU pants, right up in the groin ‘high and tight’. He cinched the windlass down mercilessly until the bleeding stooped. The rest of his team had paused to cover this and the fighter pulled the wounded man up onto his back in a Hawes carry, running back and continuing the move north, covered by the rest of the squad as they bounded back. The medic joined the wounded group and they moved north looking for a suitable rally point as the squads continued to bound back in teams. The patrol leader maintained a position between the two squads as they moved.
They continued in this way for about 300 meters. As they were about halfway they heard the whop whop whop of helicopters passing overhead, but they could not get a good view through the tree canopy. The enemy platoon was just starting to regain its balance and cautiously move forward by bounding overwatch. The patrol had temporarily broken contact and on reaching the medic and the wounded man the patrol leader called “Rally, Rally, Rally!” The squads got into an all-round defensive position and leaders checked on their fighters. The lightweight stretcher was broken out. Bravo took charge of moving their casualty, four men at a time carrying the stretcher, the other four providing security and ready to changeover as necessary. The patrol leader did a quick map check and they continued to move off north, with Alpha split into front and rear security teams to cover the casevac in the center.
As they moved north they came to a fire break that had once been used as a vehicle track. Rather than cross it or walk on it, they veered off to the north west and hand railed the feature, keeping it about seventy five meters to their right. The patrol was moving at a fast walk, the two teams of Alpha to the front and rear, with Bravo in the center carrying the stretcher with the wounded man. The patrol leader moved just behind the front team and they all moved in single file through the trees. There was something nagging at the patrol leader. The helicopters! They had passed over headed north, following the contact with the enemy platoon to the south. He had a pretty good idea that they were facing an enemy hunter-killer company, probably based off one of the old Ranger Companies from before the civil war.
Hand railing the feature, which was an obvious egress route from the patrol base, meant that the patrol avoided the main kill zone on the track, but walked into one of the flank protection/cut off groups belonging to the Airborne Reaction Force’s platoon hasty ambush. The enemy ARF had been landed by the helicopters in a clearing just off the trail to the north in response to the sweep platoon making contact with the rebel patrol base. They were to act as a blocking force (or cut off group) across the patrols expected line of exfiltration. They had expected the patrol to move along the track, and as such the main kill group was oriented in a line facing north east to cover the track. Their right hand cut-off group was a fire team sized component and they had also been concentrating on the track, where they expected the enemy to come from the south east. The patrol leader heard the shout of ‘”Contact Front!” from the lead team just as a fusillade of firing went off at the head of the patrol. The lead team had the drop on the cut-off group and had walked pretty much on top of them, opening fire at a range of fifteen meters as they saw them. The lead man opened fire on rapid and as he did so the other three in his team stepped left and right to get on line. They began to buddy move back, firing as they went, having hit at least three of the enemy cutoff group. The patrol leader moved back and Bravo, the stretcher squad, moved rapidly back while the rear team from Alpha moved back ahead of them as security and to establish a rally point. The main kill group of the new enemy platoon was trying to move out of their ambush position in order to maneuver on the patrol, but before they could do so the lead team managed to break contact in the trees.
The patrol moved back several hundred meters to a rally point and the patrol leader got them into a wedge formation, each squad forming a side of the wedge in a hasty ambush position so that each of the squads faced the last known direction of the two enemy platoons. Some of the guys provided rear protection. It was effectively a hasty triangular ambush with the third side missing, just covered to the rear by a couple of guys. The medic was working on the casualty in the center. The patrol leader was running out of options. He was still pretty close to the enemy and with the confusion in the woods it would be hard for them to bring in indirect fire. The team leaders got around and checked on the men, redistributing ammunition and ‘bombing up’ during the lull. The patrol leader was doing a map estimate and reckoned that their best bet would be to head off the high ground in a westerly direction, getting into one of the draws or ravines that ran down off the ridge, exfiltrating from the current trap. As he was about to give the order to move out they were contacted again by the enemy ARF platoon following up from the north. They were effectively in an ambush position and were able to hit the enemy lead squad with accurate effective fire, forcing them to go to ground. However, shortly after they were contacted by the original enemy sweep platoon moving up from the south east. Then a worrying thing happened: having fixed their position, the enemy pulled back. The helicopters had obviously dropped off an 81mm mortar squad and shortly after the mortar rounds came screaming in on their position: crump, crump, crump. Some of the rounds hit the trees, effectively air bursting and sending both shrapnel and wood splinters down onto the patrol. The fighters were hugging whatever cover they could find as the rounds impacted around them. Luckily, indirect fire is an area weapon and none of the patrol was hit in the first barrage. They were however, effectively suppressed. It was either dig in and die in place, or get the hell out of there.
The patrol leader gave the preparatory order: on his order, rally 300 meters west of their location. He waited for a lull in the fire and gave the order; the patrol ‘bomb burst’ out of their positions and ran like hell out of the killing area, Bravo team sprinting with the stretcher. As they ran, one of the fighters was hit with shrapnel in the upper back, puncturing his lung. He kept running, aided by a buddy, and the patrol got into yet another rally point. They got into a defensive formation again and the medic slapped an occlusive dressing on the sucking chest wound. The casualty was starting to suffer progressive respiratory distress, indicating a tension pneumothorax, so the medic put in a needle chest decompression in his upper chest below the collar bone, which alleviated the symptoms and given the exigent circumstances allowed the fighter to keep moving. They got themselves back into formation and started to move rapidly away west towards where the ground fell away down the steep sided ridge into the valley. As they moved, one of the fighters noticed the sound of a distant helicopter engine and passed the information on up the line. They reached a place where at some point the trees had been felled and it was an area of thinner tree growth extending about a hundred meters before the forest started again. It was a linear danger area but they did not really have much choice but to keep going.
As they headed across out of the forest canopy in their patrol formation, the Apache gunner picked them up on his thermal imager. He had been tracking what he thought was the hunted patrol for a few minutes, but given the close combat in the woods he had been unable to clearly identify the patrol from his own forces. The pilot maneuvered on station in order to give the gunner the best shot. The hydra 70 rocket burst in the air before it hit the patrol, sending 96 flechette darts into the center of the patrol where the stretcher party was jogging along. The casualty on the stretcher as well as the four others surrounding him disintegrated into a red mist under the impact of the flechette darts. As the patrol roiled from the shock the patrol leader screamed ‘RUN!”. Meanwhile the apache gunner switched to 30mm cannon. The cannon aimed where he looked and he decided to roll up the patrol from the rear. The 30mm M789 HEDP cannon rounds exploded around the rear security team as they were running for the tree line. The gunner chased them all the way with the cannon rounds exploding around the rear team. They didn’t make the tree line. The patrol leader had lost half his force, with just half of both squads left. They kept running into the trees. The apache could still see and track them, but there was a little more cover from the TI in the trees and some of the explosions from the 30mm rounds were absorbed by the trees. A shame it was fall: as the leaves continued to fall, the cover was reduced.
There was no ability to go back to the downed members of the patrol. It was something they had learned since the civil war began: the old rule of ‘never leave a fallen comrade’ just never worked any more when you were on the run and didn’t have the overwhelming force and assets to get them back. Sometimes fighters went down and there was nothing you could do for them. The patrol ran into a ravine and followed it as it steepened down towards the valley. In an area of the ravine with steep sides and good tree cover they went static. They each carried thermal blankets made up from poncho liners lined with mylar blankets, covered with loose cloth like a ghillie suit, designed to reduce their heat signature. They deployed the blankets and got under them, still covering their sectors and using sticks to keep the blankets up away from their bodies so they did not heat them up from underneath. The Apache had struggled to follow their move into the ravine and despite continued circling was unable to find the patrol while they were both in the ravine under the tree cover and under the blankets. After a time of searching, the Apache had to return to base to refuel, and luckily the exigencies and scarcities of the ongoing civil war meant there was no back-up to replace it on station. After a while of listening watch, the patrol determined that the Apache had gone. There was still the problem of the dismounted hunter-killer company. The patrol packed up their gear and started to head down into the valley to the west.
Then they heard the baying of the tracker dogs from the east…
The Arctic Patriot: Rapid Fire!- My Take on the Book
The Arctic Patriot: Rapid Fire!- My Take on the Book: Previously, I reviewed Max Velocity ’s book Contact . That book was a very good resource for people looking to become familiar with m...
Thanks very much to Arctic Patriot for reviewing 'Rapid Fire!' Much appreciated brother!
There is a comment there right now from Anonymous with a reply by Arctic Patriot: @Anonymous: I hear where you are coming from and your concerns (given that you have not read the book), but don't worry, this is not a 'Rambo' book. As Arctic Patriot says, there is a lot of stress of avoidance in there, and the rest is good solid TTPs. You almost answer your own question when you first say there is no point knowing these tactics, because you are not regular infantry and don't have the resources, but then go on to say it is best to just read the FMs. Well, this is not a re-hash of the FMs and brings in a lot that is not covered, some of which comes from mobile operations that are not covered in any FMs. As Arctic Patriot says, it is the tactics you need with a real life perspective, without just rehashing the manuals.
I have been asked about the book: "who is your target audience'. I wrote it as a book for those conducting 'high threat, protection and combat operations'. This applies to regular forces, paramilitaries or irregulars, whatever is relavant to you. I had a mind to fighting enemies 'foreign and domestic' when I wrote it, and thus the tactics are in there to conduct irregular resistance operations.
I never advocate massive expenditure of ammunition, that is 'projecting' assumptions onto my writings. If you are 'joe irregular' conducting a post-collapse resistance operation, you will need to adapt to the equipment and supply chain that you may or may not have. But the tactics are there all the same, and without them you will be up shit creek without a paddle. The intent of this book is to be much more 'useful' and readable than simply reading through FMs designed for regular troops/conventional operations and trying to apply the lessons you may extract from them.
Thanks very much to Arctic Patriot for reviewing 'Rapid Fire!' Much appreciated brother!
There is a comment there right now from Anonymous with a reply by Arctic Patriot: @Anonymous: I hear where you are coming from and your concerns (given that you have not read the book), but don't worry, this is not a 'Rambo' book. As Arctic Patriot says, there is a lot of stress of avoidance in there, and the rest is good solid TTPs. You almost answer your own question when you first say there is no point knowing these tactics, because you are not regular infantry and don't have the resources, but then go on to say it is best to just read the FMs. Well, this is not a re-hash of the FMs and brings in a lot that is not covered, some of which comes from mobile operations that are not covered in any FMs. As Arctic Patriot says, it is the tactics you need with a real life perspective, without just rehashing the manuals.
I have been asked about the book: "who is your target audience'. I wrote it as a book for those conducting 'high threat, protection and combat operations'. This applies to regular forces, paramilitaries or irregulars, whatever is relavant to you. I had a mind to fighting enemies 'foreign and domestic' when I wrote it, and thus the tactics are in there to conduct irregular resistance operations.
I never advocate massive expenditure of ammunition, that is 'projecting' assumptions onto my writings. If you are 'joe irregular' conducting a post-collapse resistance operation, you will need to adapt to the equipment and supply chain that you may or may not have. But the tactics are there all the same, and without them you will be up shit creek without a paddle. The intent of this book is to be much more 'useful' and readable than simply reading through FMs designed for regular troops/conventional operations and trying to apply the lessons you may extract from them.
Monday, October 15, 2012
Friday, October 12, 2012
Kicking off a little "CQB' controversy
Ok, here is some food for thought and discussion that may
well kick of some good comments! I have a ‘pet peeve’ that I will take the opportunity
to air here. It’s about ‘CQB’ and what I see being taught out there. I am not a
retired SWAT SME (subject matter expert) with a CQB school so I feel free to
air my opinion. Depending on the venue/forum that I have raised this in, I have
had varied results. ‘Tacticool’ venues populated by such SWAT types tend to
react badly in defense of their empire. I have posted some quotes below by enlightened
types who ‘get it’:
Anon Quote 1:‘CQB is a "SME" empire built on
police tactics entirely inappropriate for conventional operations in populated
areas.’
Anon Quote 2: ‘I've been concerned as
an outside observer for some time about what could be called the "law
enforcement-ization" of military tactics and operations, honestly.
Started, IMO, soon after 2001 when people started talking about military
personnel "arresting" terrorists. CQB grew from hostage rescue
techniques and LE stuff and soon become the "cool guys" method for
urban operations. The fact that it wasn't appropriate for that wide of a focus
escaped many. It just goes to show that we don't always learn the right
lessons, or understand how to correctly apply those that we do learn.’
Anon Quote 3: ‘The Marine Corps learned the flaws of our
TTPs in the urban/residential fights along the Euphrates, and in wholesale
amounts during Fallujah 2.0. I cannot remember the title, but a group of
infantrymen from 3d Bn 5th Marines wrote an excellent AAR of their fight, and
it was eye-opening.’
Anon Quote 4: ‘The title is: Lessons Learned: Infantry
Squad Tactics in Military Operations in Urban Terrain During Operation Phantom
Fury in Fallujah, Iraq. One of their conclusions is you if you know somebody
bad is actually in the building, you bring it down around their ears with tanks
or artillery as you said. The Russians learned the same thing long ago. Each of
their city fighting battle groups preferably had a great big direct fire weapon
attached. American cops basically do the same thing. If you know there will be
a fight if you go in, you don't. You gas 'em out or wait them out, active
shooters excepted. Same thing with cell extractions in prisons. You don't. You
gas 'em out.’
Anon Quote 5: 'CQB is bascially to confimrmthat there are no bad guys in a building, just to clear it.'
CQB = "Close Quarter Battle"
The issue, with my raising and questioning of the definition, seemed to be that since 9/11 certain high Tier CT units have been training extensively in urban CQB, as a sub-unit tactical activity of the larger MOUT/FIBUA picture, which has concentrated on a lot of kill/capture missions into urban or structure environments. This has spread into the wider army and civilian culture and it seemed to me that a lot of people out there think that warfare is just about room clearing (I exaggerate).
I asked the question of whether CQB is purely synonymous with urban operations, or whether CQB can be "close combat" in other environments. This is where the controversy was. Yes, urban CQB involves specific drills for room entry and clearance and all the rest, that is a given, but does that mean that is all CQB is? It is a semantics question, I know. I remember doing "CQB" on Jungle lanes.
Yes, you will not use urban CQB drill in, for instance, the Jungle. But you may be doing another type of CQB. Or is it just "close combat"? It appears that CQB has become, in the eyes of the primary CT practitioners, simply urban tactical operations.
The other side to this was my observation that due to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where a lot of raid type search/capture/clear missions have gone on, including by conventional troops, I felt we may be losing our way a little on what high intensity urban/MOUT is about. I felt that we have been applying techniques that are more suited for "permissive" environments or "semi-permissive" ones, which then carries over to kinetic completely non-permissive battlefields.
What do I mean by this? Primarily entry drills. Even the US Army small unit tactics smart book, when discussing urban entry drills, describes it as I originally learned it in the British Army; splitting the breach fire team into two man teams and moving to the breach site under cover of ground/fire support before breaching and securing the entry point with two man teams, to be rapidly exploited into the building. What do we see all the time? "SWAT" style stacking at the breach, which is usually a door.
High intensity MOUT/FIBUA involves avoiding breaching and entering via the doors if at all possible. Without going into all of it here, the basics are that a higher level entry is preferred, and via another route such as a mouse hole etc.
So, to recap: There are two strands here:
1. Is "CQB" simply an urban activity, involving entry and room clearance?
2. Have we become "too SWAT" with our building entry drills and have we forgotten how to conduct ourselves in high intensity urban operations.
An observation that I have as a British born naturalized American is that a lot of the training is very "stylized" in the US. This includes room entry, where it is all about practicing specific drills for entering and clearing the corners, dominating positions etc. The way I remember it, entering a room is a highly violent activity that is likely to result in a close encounter or just as likely a full pile into the floor after tripping over an item of furniture while getting shot at! I am wary of "stylizing" the training too much. I hope my point comes across as intended. I think you have to have good basic practiced drills, go left, go right, cover the room etc, but real rooms are full of stuff, and it can rapidly become a cluster in there. You have to be flexible and ready to adapt. Also, nothing beats aggression: 'Speed, Aggression and Surprise' to overcome friction and realities of the situation encountered inside the room.
The issue, with my raising and questioning of the definition, seemed to be that since 9/11 certain high Tier CT units have been training extensively in urban CQB, as a sub-unit tactical activity of the larger MOUT/FIBUA picture, which has concentrated on a lot of kill/capture missions into urban or structure environments. This has spread into the wider army and civilian culture and it seemed to me that a lot of people out there think that warfare is just about room clearing (I exaggerate).
I asked the question of whether CQB is purely synonymous with urban operations, or whether CQB can be "close combat" in other environments. This is where the controversy was. Yes, urban CQB involves specific drills for room entry and clearance and all the rest, that is a given, but does that mean that is all CQB is? It is a semantics question, I know. I remember doing "CQB" on Jungle lanes.
Yes, you will not use urban CQB drill in, for instance, the Jungle. But you may be doing another type of CQB. Or is it just "close combat"? It appears that CQB has become, in the eyes of the primary CT practitioners, simply urban tactical operations.
The other side to this was my observation that due to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where a lot of raid type search/capture/clear missions have gone on, including by conventional troops, I felt we may be losing our way a little on what high intensity urban/MOUT is about. I felt that we have been applying techniques that are more suited for "permissive" environments or "semi-permissive" ones, which then carries over to kinetic completely non-permissive battlefields.
What do I mean by this? Primarily entry drills. Even the US Army small unit tactics smart book, when discussing urban entry drills, describes it as I originally learned it in the British Army; splitting the breach fire team into two man teams and moving to the breach site under cover of ground/fire support before breaching and securing the entry point with two man teams, to be rapidly exploited into the building. What do we see all the time? "SWAT" style stacking at the breach, which is usually a door.
High intensity MOUT/FIBUA involves avoiding breaching and entering via the doors if at all possible. Without going into all of it here, the basics are that a higher level entry is preferred, and via another route such as a mouse hole etc.
So, to recap: There are two strands here:
1. Is "CQB" simply an urban activity, involving entry and room clearance?
2. Have we become "too SWAT" with our building entry drills and have we forgotten how to conduct ourselves in high intensity urban operations.
An observation that I have as a British born naturalized American is that a lot of the training is very "stylized" in the US. This includes room entry, where it is all about practicing specific drills for entering and clearing the corners, dominating positions etc. The way I remember it, entering a room is a highly violent activity that is likely to result in a close encounter or just as likely a full pile into the floor after tripping over an item of furniture while getting shot at! I am wary of "stylizing" the training too much. I hope my point comes across as intended. I think you have to have good basic practiced drills, go left, go right, cover the room etc, but real rooms are full of stuff, and it can rapidly become a cluster in there. You have to be flexible and ready to adapt. Also, nothing beats aggression: 'Speed, Aggression and Surprise'
It appears that many of those whom I tried to raise this
issue with for discussion, are in fact embedded in the "industry" as
SMEs - a quick website check got me that info. Mainly retired police/SWAT types
with some military experience. Defending empires I guess.
I have never claimed to be "CQB" SME. I have certainly "done" CQB, and trained others, but a lot of it was called it urban operations, MOUT/FIBUA and room clearing. A search of the internet and sites like youtube is Interesting: very stylized drills that are not really appropriate and work well in empty kill house type rooms. When watching the way people are trained, I can't help but notice that they seem to almost ignore the center of the room, give it a quick glance, in favor of concentrating on "dominating" the corners.
I was originally in the British Army. In the Parachute Regiment we were considered very good at FIBUA. The British SAS is considered the premier "CQB" hostage rescue outfit and has been since the Iranian Embassy siege in 1982. If you look at some of the completely open source youtube videos of veterans showing somewhat outdated tactics, they don't do anything like the current US CQB teaching.
Example: they will enter the room, one goes left, one right, but only so far to clear the "fatal funnel" and get out of the way of the door. They will then engage targets in the room and the third guy will come in as back up. The fourth man will do security in the corridor (assuming they are acting as a somewhat independently moving team and don't have another teams coming behind, and that they are going back out into the corridor as they clear multiple rooms).
As to high intensity FIBUA, a little summary: We were well trained at it, up to Company and Battalion level. Feeding into buildings and breaching through to avoid the outside and open spaces. It's all about link men and coordination! Back down to the tactical level, for any kind of normal residential type rooms, we would assault with two men, closely backed up by the rest of the team. Grenade goes in (not all the time, would use too many), one assaulter goes left, one goes right. Cover the room with fire. Fire into available cover if the tactical situation calls for it. Make sure the room is clear. Call room clear and indentify exits from the room for the section commander so when he entered he could rapidly make a plan to push the next assault team through into the next space. Repeat.
Buildings are defended and not easy to get through. The full gamut of OBUA defensive tactics would be used to foil assault teams. Houses could be full of wire, rooms with furniture. No stairs, just as examples. Ladders and breaking tools would be carried, similarly to the way we carried assault ladders for urban movement recently in Helmand, when you need to patrol over the maze of alleyways and urban compound type terrain. Those mud compound walls are so strong that you need a bar mine type charge to breach them.
I have never claimed to be "CQB" SME. I have certainly "done" CQB, and trained others, but a lot of it was called it urban operations, MOUT/FIBUA and room clearing. A search of the internet and sites like youtube is Interesting: very stylized drills that are not really appropriate and work well in empty kill house type rooms. When watching the way people are trained, I can't help but notice that they seem to almost ignore the center of the room, give it a quick glance, in favor of concentrating on "dominating" the corners.
I was originally in the British Army. In the Parachute Regiment we were considered very good at FIBUA. The British SAS is considered the premier "CQB" hostage rescue outfit and has been since the Iranian Embassy siege in 1982. If you look at some of the completely open source youtube videos of veterans showing somewhat outdated tactics, they don't do anything like the current US CQB teaching.
Example: they will enter the room, one goes left, one right, but only so far to clear the "fatal funnel" and get out of the way of the door. They will then engage targets in the room and the third guy will come in as back up. The fourth man will do security in the corridor (assuming they are acting as a somewhat independently moving team and don't have another teams coming behind, and that they are going back out into the corridor as they clear multiple rooms).
As to high intensity FIBUA, a little summary: We were well trained at it, up to Company and Battalion level. Feeding into buildings and breaching through to avoid the outside and open spaces. It's all about link men and coordination! Back down to the tactical level, for any kind of normal residential type rooms, we would assault with two men, closely backed up by the rest of the team. Grenade goes in (not all the time, would use too many), one assaulter goes left, one goes right. Cover the room with fire. Fire into available cover if the tactical situation calls for it. Make sure the room is clear. Call room clear and indentify exits from the room for the section commander so when he entered he could rapidly make a plan to push the next assault team through into the next space. Repeat.
Buildings are defended and not easy to get through. The full gamut of OBUA defensive tactics would be used to foil assault teams. Houses could be full of wire, rooms with furniture. No stairs, just as examples. Ladders and breaking tools would be carried, similarly to the way we carried assault ladders for urban movement recently in Helmand, when you need to patrol over the maze of alleyways and urban compound type terrain. Those mud compound walls are so strong that you need a bar mine type charge to breach them.
This is not a Brit bashing at US tactics. I know that the
real US tactics are very close to UK for MOUT/FIBUA. With our current
"SWAT Team" focus we seem to have forgotten that?
The ‘So
What’:
Re: "CQB" ‘black art tactics’ (sarcasm), neither the police nor the military do, would, or should, use them when there are actual armed and ready bad guys inside a structure, unless you are conducting Tier 1 DA.
So: CQB room entry and clearing drills are best utilized simply to confirm that a room(s) is/are clear, with the potential for bad guys in there but not really considered high threat. Unless as pointed out you are Tier 1 DA and have no choice, but are super high speed anyway, and will usually use a shock tactic such as a flash bang/grenade to gain initiative from the defender when making entry.
So: infantry need to be trained for high intensity MOUT/OBUA ‘just in case’ or indeed as we always say, in order to train for the worst case: "train hard fight easy". But in reality we will seek alternative means within the rules of engagement to destroy or neutralize enemy combatants prior to "clearing" those structures. We want to avoid dynamic building and room entry in high intensity conflict where the bad guys are alive and tip top inside there, if we can. And if we do go in, and we don’t have a tank gun or thermo baric weapon in direct support, we would rather go in through the roof or a mouse hole or some such alternative to the front door.
Interestingly, when buildings are damaged and we include tunnels, rat runs etc, then we can't really do the urban specific "CQB" SME room entry drills, because rooms/buildings have been rearranged by fire. So, then it becomes close combat or "non-SME taught" CQB which comes full circle back to my original point: if urban room clearing type CQB is the totality of all CQB, or whether other close combat is CQB also, with urban CQB being simply a specific sub-set.
We also need to think seriously about getting back to a point where we train infantry to do the real high intensity breach and room/building clearance drills, rather than the current norm "SWAT type", as laid out in publications such as the small unit tactics smart book (US). I recall that BritMil had a battalion in Berlin during the cold war the exclusively trained in FIBUA high intensity tactics.
Re: "CQB" ‘black art tactics’ (sarcasm), neither the police nor the military do, would, or should, use them when there are actual armed and ready bad guys inside a structure, unless you are conducting Tier 1 DA.
So: CQB room entry and clearing drills are best utilized simply to confirm that a room(s) is/are clear, with the potential for bad guys in there but not really considered high threat. Unless as pointed out you are Tier 1 DA and have no choice, but are super high speed anyway, and will usually use a shock tactic such as a flash bang/grenade to gain initiative from the defender when making entry.
So: infantry need to be trained for high intensity MOUT/OBUA ‘just in case’ or indeed as we always say, in order to train for the worst case: "train hard fight easy". But in reality we will seek alternative means within the rules of engagement to destroy or neutralize enemy combatants prior to "clearing" those structures. We want to avoid dynamic building and room entry in high intensity conflict where the bad guys are alive and tip top inside there, if we can. And if we do go in, and we don’t have a tank gun or thermo baric weapon in direct support, we would rather go in through the roof or a mouse hole or some such alternative to the front door.
Interestingly, when buildings are damaged and we include tunnels, rat runs etc, then we can't really do the urban specific "CQB" SME room entry drills, because rooms/buildings have been rearranged by fire. So, then it becomes close combat or "non-SME taught" CQB which comes full circle back to my original point: if urban room clearing type CQB is the totality of all CQB, or whether other close combat is CQB also, with urban CQB being simply a specific sub-set.
We also need to think seriously about getting back to a point where we train infantry to do the real high intensity breach and room/building clearance drills, rather than the current norm "SWAT type", as laid out in publications such as the small unit tactics smart book (US). I recall that BritMil had a battalion in Berlin during the cold war the exclusively trained in FIBUA high intensity tactics.
Food for thought and discussion....
Wednesday, October 10, 2012
More about those darned 'Constitutionalists'!
From Truth is Treason
Run that one by me again: Law Enforcement, who swore an oath to uphold the Constitution, see others who uphold the importance of the Constitution as bad people?
I swore the military version of that Oath and take it seriously.
I usually try and stick with tactics, given it's my strong point rather than politics, but I need to say that I would not suffer such lack or respect towards my dignity or basic rights. No one should have to.
I see far too much footage of fat guys kneeling on citizens, punching and tasing them. Serve and Protect, not look for excuses to assault and arrest.
When is the line going to be drawn and when is the return to Constitutional law and the rights and dignity of Citizens going to begin?
Resist this madness.
Run that one by me again: Law Enforcement, who swore an oath to uphold the Constitution, see others who uphold the importance of the Constitution as bad people?
I swore the military version of that Oath and take it seriously.
I usually try and stick with tactics, given it's my strong point rather than politics, but I need to say that I would not suffer such lack or respect towards my dignity or basic rights. No one should have to.
I see far too much footage of fat guys kneeling on citizens, punching and tasing them. Serve and Protect, not look for excuses to assault and arrest.
When is the line going to be drawn and when is the return to Constitutional law and the rights and dignity of Citizens going to begin?
Resist this madness.
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
Truth is Treason: 'Everything will Collapse'
'Everything Will Collapse'
and
Martial Law, Economic Meltdown and Executive Orders
As a responsible father and loyal, law abiding citizen, I have been prepping for difficult times ahead.
We now have more than 7 days supply of food.
What perfect madness that this now labels us as 'Domestic Terrorists'!
Where are we going to draw the line?
and
Martial Law, Economic Meltdown and Executive Orders
As a responsible father and loyal, law abiding citizen, I have been prepping for difficult times ahead.
We now have more than 7 days supply of food.
What perfect madness that this now labels us as 'Domestic Terrorists'!
Where are we going to draw the line?
Resistor in the Rockies: The Republic is Dead, But I Am Not
Resistor in the Rockies: The Republic is Dead, But I Am Not: Photo by Michael Friberg Tonight, 3 flags were retired at the Cub Scout pack meeting of my 2 oldest boys. The following script was rea...
HEAT Movie Shootout!!!
I wanted to draw attention to the HEAT shootout scene because it is excellent, and demonstrates, in a Hollywood way, some break contact drills, initially from a vehicle, then dismounted.
HEAT Shootout Scene (This is not the best quality YouTube example, but the good one appears to have been taken down)
It a great scene, there is so much to it. It was choreographed by "Andy MacNab" of Bravo Two Zero fame, first Gulf War, retired from the British SAS. There is more on the training here:
Heat Shootout Behind the Scenes Feature
It incorporates vehicle and dismounted break contact drills. Initially they try and get away in the vehicle, firing from inside it, which you can do from a soft skinned vehicle. Then the vehicle is immobilized (driver shot) and they dismount and try to fight off the "X" utilizing fire and movement. The drills are great, changing mags, shouting "MOVE", fire and movement until they split up, but then Kilmer and De Niro still buddy pair together, then Kilmer becomes 'man down".
They have to initally fire in both directions once they get out of the vehicle, showing the 360 degree nature of the threat. There is actually a lot in this clip and although it is scripted for a movie the tactics behind it are genuine break contact drills.
HEAT Shootout Scene (This is not the best quality YouTube example, but the good one appears to have been taken down)
It a great scene, there is so much to it. It was choreographed by "Andy MacNab" of Bravo Two Zero fame, first Gulf War, retired from the British SAS. There is more on the training here:
Heat Shootout Behind the Scenes Feature
It incorporates vehicle and dismounted break contact drills. Initially they try and get away in the vehicle, firing from inside it, which you can do from a soft skinned vehicle. Then the vehicle is immobilized (driver shot) and they dismount and try to fight off the "X" utilizing fire and movement. The drills are great, changing mags, shouting "MOVE", fire and movement until they split up, but then Kilmer and De Niro still buddy pair together, then Kilmer becomes 'man down".
They have to initally fire in both directions once they get out of the vehicle, showing the 360 degree nature of the threat. There is actually a lot in this clip and although it is scripted for a movie the tactics behind it are genuine break contact drills.
Real Ambush Video & Comments
I am posting this video because it illustrates a lot of points. I remember this happening back when I was working in Baghdad, and I saw the after action review at the time. My intent is not to criticize the actions of the team, but to make constructive comments.
Ambush Video
Now, I will state here that 'it is not the critic that counts, but the man in the arena with blood on his face'. It is not my intent to criticise the actions of this team, but to use the video to make some constructive training points. It is also my understanding the one of the team members, James Yeager, has his own Internet presence and has been criticized for his actions by moving off the 'X' to the median. However, as I state below, it appears that team cohesive drills were lacking so individuals would have reacted both as that, individuals, and also as per their training and experience. It is hard to criticise:
It is my understanding that this team was not well knitted and had not really been trained or rehearsed together in drills. They were heading from the Green Zone to the Airport (BIAP) along Route Irish, which is the BIAP road and extremely high threat. They had been forced to stop in the road because a US route clearance team was clearing an IED ahead of them, and behind them was the mass of Iraqi traffic that they had flagged and warned off to stay 100 meters away. They had adopted the staggered formation and were just discussing on the radio (the audio is very important on the clip) the idea of backing up and getting out of there because they were so exposed. At that point they were engaged with small arms fire from buildings about 100 meters to the side of the road to the right of the camera. The enemy was possibly two machine gunners with PKMs, which are the Soviet Bloc equivalent of an M60 or 240B, firing 7.62 x 51mm rounds (or .308 civilian equivalents).
The team does not appear to have any consolidated or rehearsed drills, with various members doing different things. Note the one who reacts by moving away from the vehicles into the cover of the median to the left, while others take cover behind the vehicles. I believe that only one of the vehicles was armored, the center one. Apparently they thought that at least one of their vehicles was immobilized on the “X” (kill zone), but it appears that one of the drivers may have placed the vehicle in neutral, got no response when he hit the gas, and thought his car was immobilized. This is a reaction due to adrenalin and tunnel vision in such a situation. The armor of the center vehicle may be why the passenger on the right of the center vehicle opens the door to return fire, thinks better of it, and closes it again.
You can hear on the audio that driver of the camera car is hit in the femoral and he actually bleeds out and dies. This could potentially have been prevented by the use of a tourniquet “high and tight”. He is at one point dragged out of the car by the guy you can see at the camera vehicle. The camera is knocked off aim and you can hear the US Army troops who have arrived to assist talking and asking about a white car that has pulled forward from the Iraqi traffic to the rear.
Unfortunately, they sat out in the open for too long and were engaged with a small arms fire ambush. Their vehicles were not actually immobilized but some of them thought they were, and others perhaps because they were static reacted by getting out and returning fire. So they did not conduct vehicle break contact drills and they remained on the X. Once dismounted, with the exception of the one guy who moves right to left off to the median, they stay in place, perhaps waiting for the support of the US Army (one guy waves to them from the center vehicle). They do have casualties and tend to them beside the vehicle rather than breaking contact and dragging and carrying the casualties away into better cover. There are many things that they could have done, but without being a rehearsed and tight knit team that were not coordinated enough to do them at that time. Luckily, military support was close by. Given that their vehicles were not immobilized they would have been better mounting up and extracting, getting the casualties to the hospital as soon as possible.
The video gives some idea of the effect and sound of a small arms ambush into a roadway and vehicles.
Ambush Video
Now, I will state here that 'it is not the critic that counts, but the man in the arena with blood on his face'. It is not my intent to criticise the actions of this team, but to use the video to make some constructive training points. It is also my understanding the one of the team members, James Yeager, has his own Internet presence and has been criticized for his actions by moving off the 'X' to the median. However, as I state below, it appears that team cohesive drills were lacking so individuals would have reacted both as that, individuals, and also as per their training and experience. It is hard to criticise:
It is my understanding that this team was not well knitted and had not really been trained or rehearsed together in drills. They were heading from the Green Zone to the Airport (BIAP) along Route Irish, which is the BIAP road and extremely high threat. They had been forced to stop in the road because a US route clearance team was clearing an IED ahead of them, and behind them was the mass of Iraqi traffic that they had flagged and warned off to stay 100 meters away. They had adopted the staggered formation and were just discussing on the radio (the audio is very important on the clip) the idea of backing up and getting out of there because they were so exposed. At that point they were engaged with small arms fire from buildings about 100 meters to the side of the road to the right of the camera. The enemy was possibly two machine gunners with PKMs, which are the Soviet Bloc equivalent of an M60 or 240B, firing 7.62 x 51mm rounds (or .308 civilian equivalents).
The team does not appear to have any consolidated or rehearsed drills, with various members doing different things. Note the one who reacts by moving away from the vehicles into the cover of the median to the left, while others take cover behind the vehicles. I believe that only one of the vehicles was armored, the center one. Apparently they thought that at least one of their vehicles was immobilized on the “X” (kill zone), but it appears that one of the drivers may have placed the vehicle in neutral, got no response when he hit the gas, and thought his car was immobilized. This is a reaction due to adrenalin and tunnel vision in such a situation. The armor of the center vehicle may be why the passenger on the right of the center vehicle opens the door to return fire, thinks better of it, and closes it again.
You can hear on the audio that driver of the camera car is hit in the femoral and he actually bleeds out and dies. This could potentially have been prevented by the use of a tourniquet “high and tight”. He is at one point dragged out of the car by the guy you can see at the camera vehicle. The camera is knocked off aim and you can hear the US Army troops who have arrived to assist talking and asking about a white car that has pulled forward from the Iraqi traffic to the rear.
Unfortunately, they sat out in the open for too long and were engaged with a small arms fire ambush. Their vehicles were not actually immobilized but some of them thought they were, and others perhaps because they were static reacted by getting out and returning fire. So they did not conduct vehicle break contact drills and they remained on the X. Once dismounted, with the exception of the one guy who moves right to left off to the median, they stay in place, perhaps waiting for the support of the US Army (one guy waves to them from the center vehicle). They do have casualties and tend to them beside the vehicle rather than breaking contact and dragging and carrying the casualties away into better cover. There are many things that they could have done, but without being a rehearsed and tight knit team that were not coordinated enough to do them at that time. Luckily, military support was close by. Given that their vehicles were not immobilized they would have been better mounting up and extracting, getting the casualties to the hospital as soon as possible.
The video gives some idea of the effect and sound of a small arms ambush into a roadway and vehicles.
Monday, October 8, 2012
Combat Studies Group: The Three Man Team
Combat Studies Group: The Three Man Team: Combat effectiveness – a view from the outside in Years ago while still in uniform, I was selected to take part in a large training...
Case Study: Caches and Searching
It seems like a good interest/history topic to cover some first hand experiences of caches and search procedures in counter terrorist operations. It s a little at variance to what we have mainly been used to since 9/11 in terms of the 'GWOT'. During my time in the British Army I spent a deal of time on 'operational deployments' to Northern Ireland, mainly during the 1990's.
So, what are we talking about? Imagine the situation in Northern Ireland. It is a First World Country, part of the United Kingdom (that point being the large part of the debate and reason for the insurgency!) There is a porous border to the south (sound familiar?) and terrorist operations were taking place in and amongst the population, which is very sectarian. It would be a mistake to underestimate the Irish Republican Terrorist, but respecting them for employing effective tactics is different from being able to respect them as human beings due to the overt tactics of causing mass deaths of innocent civilians through the deliberate use of large IEDs and targeting of civilians to maximise terror and effect.
There is a framework to how this all went. Surveillance and intelligence operations are a big part of what the British Government was doing to combat the threat. 'Green Army' troops are deployed extensively on the ground in support of the police and sometimes full on combat situations happened, other times it was more terrorist in nature. Due to this surveillance, and the efforts of the British to disrupt terrorist movement and operations, it was hard for them to move weapons into place for an operation. VCPs (Vehicle Check Points) were a hazard and could happen anywhere at any time. Thus, passing through them it may be obvious that a carload of 'players' are who they are, but they can't be arrested or detained without reason. They will be allowed on their way. There are rules to this game.
So, the terrorists develop a system. They have a logistics chain with 'quartermasters'. Weapons are moved along this chain. The idea is that when an operation is to go down, weapons will be moved to a cache. This means that the players can collect the weapons and carry out the operation with minimum movement carrying those weapons. Remember that these are not suicide types so the operation will only go down if they think they can get away with it, so as the parts are moving they need to be sure of their escape route. For example, if they are going to conduct a shoot onto a Brit patrol, they will only go through with it if they can identify all the elements of the patrol and thus be sure that their escape route is accessible (Satellite Patrolling is a counter to this).
The cache is an interesting thing. There has to be a system so that with the cut-outs employed the various parts know where to find the cache. In a rural area it is often something like a buried PVC pipe in the side of a ditch, with end caps so it stays water tight. There is a system for identifying it. There will be a series of markers, or reference points. For example: drive along the 'X' road until you get to the 'parking area'. There is a tree struck by lightning (marker 1). Follow the dirth north from the tree to the fifth fence post (marker 2) then ...etc (marker 3), cache is below it. Weapons will be picked up, operation carried out, weapons dropped.
The other side to this is the security forces response. Randon searches upset the locals so they are not allowed. The 5 and 25 meter checks that troops deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan learn actually developed in the years of counter IED operations in Northern Ireland, where they were the 5 and 20 meter checks. The 5 meter check is an individual check when stopping, to ensure you are not sitting on a device, or for example you may notice a command wire snaking down the wire of a barbed wire fence. The 20 meter check is done for a patrol stop, to secure an area from devices and from command wires running into it. This 20 meter check can be done as an 'extended 20 meter check' to search an area. Areas can be searched at random or in response to a tip. On a patrol, the team will decide to search an area. To do this, they will use a technique developed, which uses the same marker system as the terrorists. Simply, identify items that would suit use as reference points, start there and try to identify what the next marker would likely be. If you do find a cache, be careful it may be booby trapped with a pressure plate or other device. It may be empty. If you find one, you can either flag it up the chain so EOD comes out and you clear it, or if you are clever you use it as the basis of an operation to try and follow the chain to the actual quartermasters. Covert cameras to observe the cache, perhaps moving to a live OP. In extremis, a 'reactive OP' can be carried out, because 'ambush' is not a politically correct term.
Remember that military operations were carried out under the strict rules of engagement of the 'yellow card'. If a terrorist fires at you and then drops his weapon, you cannot engage. Basically, they had to have the weapon up and pointed at you before you could return fire. Your own weapons were carried loaded but not made ready, so that a trained response to contact involved cocking your weapon before removing the safety catch and returning fire.
There was a lot to this cat and mouse game, but I hope this serves as a useful interest post.
So, what are we talking about? Imagine the situation in Northern Ireland. It is a First World Country, part of the United Kingdom (that point being the large part of the debate and reason for the insurgency!) There is a porous border to the south (sound familiar?) and terrorist operations were taking place in and amongst the population, which is very sectarian. It would be a mistake to underestimate the Irish Republican Terrorist, but respecting them for employing effective tactics is different from being able to respect them as human beings due to the overt tactics of causing mass deaths of innocent civilians through the deliberate use of large IEDs and targeting of civilians to maximise terror and effect.
There is a framework to how this all went. Surveillance and intelligence operations are a big part of what the British Government was doing to combat the threat. 'Green Army' troops are deployed extensively on the ground in support of the police and sometimes full on combat situations happened, other times it was more terrorist in nature. Due to this surveillance, and the efforts of the British to disrupt terrorist movement and operations, it was hard for them to move weapons into place for an operation. VCPs (Vehicle Check Points) were a hazard and could happen anywhere at any time. Thus, passing through them it may be obvious that a carload of 'players' are who they are, but they can't be arrested or detained without reason. They will be allowed on their way. There are rules to this game.
So, the terrorists develop a system. They have a logistics chain with 'quartermasters'. Weapons are moved along this chain. The idea is that when an operation is to go down, weapons will be moved to a cache. This means that the players can collect the weapons and carry out the operation with minimum movement carrying those weapons. Remember that these are not suicide types so the operation will only go down if they think they can get away with it, so as the parts are moving they need to be sure of their escape route. For example, if they are going to conduct a shoot onto a Brit patrol, they will only go through with it if they can identify all the elements of the patrol and thus be sure that their escape route is accessible (Satellite Patrolling is a counter to this).
The cache is an interesting thing. There has to be a system so that with the cut-outs employed the various parts know where to find the cache. In a rural area it is often something like a buried PVC pipe in the side of a ditch, with end caps so it stays water tight. There is a system for identifying it. There will be a series of markers, or reference points. For example: drive along the 'X' road until you get to the 'parking area'. There is a tree struck by lightning (marker 1). Follow the dirth north from the tree to the fifth fence post (marker 2) then ...etc (marker 3), cache is below it. Weapons will be picked up, operation carried out, weapons dropped.
The other side to this is the security forces response. Randon searches upset the locals so they are not allowed. The 5 and 25 meter checks that troops deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan learn actually developed in the years of counter IED operations in Northern Ireland, where they were the 5 and 20 meter checks. The 5 meter check is an individual check when stopping, to ensure you are not sitting on a device, or for example you may notice a command wire snaking down the wire of a barbed wire fence. The 20 meter check is done for a patrol stop, to secure an area from devices and from command wires running into it. This 20 meter check can be done as an 'extended 20 meter check' to search an area. Areas can be searched at random or in response to a tip. On a patrol, the team will decide to search an area. To do this, they will use a technique developed, which uses the same marker system as the terrorists. Simply, identify items that would suit use as reference points, start there and try to identify what the next marker would likely be. If you do find a cache, be careful it may be booby trapped with a pressure plate or other device. It may be empty. If you find one, you can either flag it up the chain so EOD comes out and you clear it, or if you are clever you use it as the basis of an operation to try and follow the chain to the actual quartermasters. Covert cameras to observe the cache, perhaps moving to a live OP. In extremis, a 'reactive OP' can be carried out, because 'ambush' is not a politically correct term.
Remember that military operations were carried out under the strict rules of engagement of the 'yellow card'. If a terrorist fires at you and then drops his weapon, you cannot engage. Basically, they had to have the weapon up and pointed at you before you could return fire. Your own weapons were carried loaded but not made ready, so that a trained response to contact involved cocking your weapon before removing the safety catch and returning fire.
There was a lot to this cat and mouse game, but I hope this serves as a useful interest post.
Saturday, October 6, 2012
Choosing Contact or Rapid Fire - need to know
In the interest of fairness I want to put it out there that I don't recommend that you buy both Contact and Rapid Fire (unless you really want to.....) :-)
The reason is that they are not designed as sequels, but are simply aimed at different audiences. Thus, there is an amount of material, the main bulk of the tactical stuff, that is common to both books.
Contact is designed for preppers and does also cover all the small unit tactics. Rapid fire omits all mention of prepping and contains more information about OCONUS type operations. It is aimed more at a military and contractor type audience. For example, Contact does not discuss conducting helicopter operations, simply because that s not really expected in a post collapse environment (never say never....). However, it contains all the small unit tactics that are common to both books.
You will get the tactics necessary for your tactical team in a post collapse or resistance environment from both books. Contact has the additional stuff aimed at prepping scenarios and situations involving your family, Rapid Fire goes more into Iraq/Afghanistan style operations.
It makes me happy if you really do buy both, but I have to recommend choosing one or the other depending on your particular interest.
I would recommend both books for training up tactical teams, they both contain the same core of tactical information.
The reason is that they are not designed as sequels, but are simply aimed at different audiences. Thus, there is an amount of material, the main bulk of the tactical stuff, that is common to both books.
Contact is designed for preppers and does also cover all the small unit tactics. Rapid fire omits all mention of prepping and contains more information about OCONUS type operations. It is aimed more at a military and contractor type audience. For example, Contact does not discuss conducting helicopter operations, simply because that s not really expected in a post collapse environment (never say never....). However, it contains all the small unit tactics that are common to both books.
You will get the tactics necessary for your tactical team in a post collapse or resistance environment from both books. Contact has the additional stuff aimed at prepping scenarios and situations involving your family, Rapid Fire goes more into Iraq/Afghanistan style operations.
It makes me happy if you really do buy both, but I have to recommend choosing one or the other depending on your particular interest.
I would recommend both books for training up tactical teams, they both contain the same core of tactical information.
The Arctic Patriot: Further Thoughts
The Arctic Patriot: Further Thoughts: I wanted to say something I left out of this post from yesterday. I talked about an op in that post, and used it as an example of using th...
I Like it. To add: however doctrinal and clever you get at your strategic/operational level, when it comes down to applying force, it will involve the basics of tactics and violence of action. It's just a matter of how you do it and whether you are fighting smart or not. That references back to the post on bayonet fighting and Mosby's thoughts on violence of action and sticking the pointy end in the soft parts.
I Like it. To add: however doctrinal and clever you get at your strategic/operational level, when it comes down to applying force, it will involve the basics of tactics and violence of action. It's just a matter of how you do it and whether you are fighting smart or not. That references back to the post on bayonet fighting and Mosby's thoughts on violence of action and sticking the pointy end in the soft parts.
Opinion on effective tactics for the coming collapse
I have been a soldier in some form all my adult life. It doesn't make me the baddest SOB in the valley, far from it and I make no claim to it, but I have some knowledge that I have a desire to pass on to others. More recently, I have got into prepping for the survival of my family.Given my background, I have a head start in the security area of prepping, but many have huge head starts over me in the other desired and required skills that will be essential to survival.
The more I read, the more I form the opinion that certainly not all, but perhaps “some” or “many” preppers out there are making the simple mistake of thinking that with the subject of security, they can simply “tick the box”. Preparing for the protection of your family cannot be simply taken care of by having guns; not in the same way that hunger can be taken care of by stocking food.
It is simply not sufficient to exercise your right to bear arms and own guns, without being tactically proficient. Even for the good shots, that is not the same as being able to perform tactically. The kind of tactical challenges that you will face post-SHTF will be in a different league to, for example, confronting an intruder in the dead of night with your handgun or shotgun. Think marauding gangs of looters, going from house to house, raping and killing. Even if you have a remote retreat, you will need tactical know-how at some point.
I hope to contribute to help with this shortfall. That is why I wrote 'Contact' and 'Rapid Fire', and why I started this blog and am willing to train others. The idea is to allow access to these skills to law abiding honest prepper types. As for 'Contact', it is the result of a consideration of a societal collapse and the civil shift and aftermath that would impact individuals and families who are intent on survival. The aim is to provide information to enhance security, tactics and survival skills of law-abiding citizens who are faced with civil disorder, lawlessness, violence and physical threat in a post-collapse environment. The information is derived from years of experience gained from service with special operations forces (SOF) followed by years of employment as a security contractor in hostile environments including Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a distillation of military and security training, principles, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) adapted to the threat and environment anticipated in this type of scenario in order to provide knowledge needed to train to survive in a world turned upside down. It is no longer just survival of the fittest but survival of those prepared.
The manual will take you from self-defense as an individual, team and family, both pre and post collapse, and move on to tactics, techniques, procedures and training that can be used by tactical teams that you may need to form in order to survive. In a serious post-event scenario, one of total collapse with several months or years before recovery, families, groups and communities may be forced to create such tactical defense forces to protect personnel, loved ones and resources against marauders. There is something in this manual for both the tactical newbie and the military veteran.
Reading through forums and articles I see many of the same questions out there about what techniques to use, how to defend yourself, your loved ones and your home, and similar. I hope to answer these questions. Also, the book takes you from tactics for survival of yourself and your family, including vehicle movement and defending your home, through to small unit tactics. These small unit tactics require the training of tactical teams and would form the basis of a group that you would use to conduct operations post SHTF to defend your location, compound or small town. This compendium of infantry, special operations and close protection tactics would also allow you to carry out an effective American Insurgency against invading enemies, foreign or domestic, into the post-SHTF vacuum. Resist.
Discussion welcome!
The more I read, the more I form the opinion that certainly not all, but perhaps “some” or “many” preppers out there are making the simple mistake of thinking that with the subject of security, they can simply “tick the box”. Preparing for the protection of your family cannot be simply taken care of by having guns; not in the same way that hunger can be taken care of by stocking food.
It is simply not sufficient to exercise your right to bear arms and own guns, without being tactically proficient. Even for the good shots, that is not the same as being able to perform tactically. The kind of tactical challenges that you will face post-SHTF will be in a different league to, for example, confronting an intruder in the dead of night with your handgun or shotgun. Think marauding gangs of looters, going from house to house, raping and killing. Even if you have a remote retreat, you will need tactical know-how at some point.
I hope to contribute to help with this shortfall. That is why I wrote 'Contact' and 'Rapid Fire', and why I started this blog and am willing to train others. The idea is to allow access to these skills to law abiding honest prepper types. As for 'Contact', it is the result of a consideration of a societal collapse and the civil shift and aftermath that would impact individuals and families who are intent on survival. The aim is to provide information to enhance security, tactics and survival skills of law-abiding citizens who are faced with civil disorder, lawlessness, violence and physical threat in a post-collapse environment. The information is derived from years of experience gained from service with special operations forces (SOF) followed by years of employment as a security contractor in hostile environments including Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a distillation of military and security training, principles, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) adapted to the threat and environment anticipated in this type of scenario in order to provide knowledge needed to train to survive in a world turned upside down. It is no longer just survival of the fittest but survival of those prepared.
The manual will take you from self-defense as an individual, team and family, both pre and post collapse, and move on to tactics, techniques, procedures and training that can be used by tactical teams that you may need to form in order to survive. In a serious post-event scenario, one of total collapse with several months or years before recovery, families, groups and communities may be forced to create such tactical defense forces to protect personnel, loved ones and resources against marauders. There is something in this manual for both the tactical newbie and the military veteran.
Reading through forums and articles I see many of the same questions out there about what techniques to use, how to defend yourself, your loved ones and your home, and similar. I hope to answer these questions. Also, the book takes you from tactics for survival of yourself and your family, including vehicle movement and defending your home, through to small unit tactics. These small unit tactics require the training of tactical teams and would form the basis of a group that you would use to conduct operations post SHTF to defend your location, compound or small town. This compendium of infantry, special operations and close protection tactics would also allow you to carry out an effective American Insurgency against invading enemies, foreign or domestic, into the post-SHTF vacuum. Resist.
Discussion welcome!
'Camping' after the SHTF
This is an extract of some comments I made on a forum and the follow up. The background is that the envisaged scenario is more family survival in a WROL SHTF situation, rather than resistance operations against enemies 'foreign or domestic'. See my earlier post on 'tactical overnighting in the woods' for a more operational point of view:
Just a few thoughts on how you may have to adapt your camping once the S has HTF.
Assuming you have bugged out somewhere and are camping, because we are talking civil breakdown and all that, we have to assume that there are potential bad guys out there. This will mean that your camping will have to take on a more tactical form. Without going into too great a detail, here are a few factors you may want to think about:
1. Location: pick a concealed location preferably without an obvious access route, allowing you observation of the approaches to your campsite. Try to not be with others, unless they are part of your group i.e. don't be at a National Park campsite. Try to conceal your location. Avoiding trouble by using concealment is the best policy.
2. Light and noise discipline. No lights at night, keep the noise and goofing off down. This means no campfire at night, lamps etc. You are not camping, you are surviving in the woods. If they see your campfire, they are coming.
3. Cooking: tied in with the light thing, you should consider getting all your cooking done in daylight and eating earlier.
4. Security: make sure you have sentries out, even if this is just a roving guard. Also, use buddies to go do tasks, such as hunting or collecting water or wood.
5. Have a 'stand to' plan for if you are bumped by bad guys. Initially the sentry will be engaging them, but the rest need to roll out, grab weapons and move to defensive positions.
6. 'Bug Out": as part of the 'stand to" plan individuals should be designated to pack stuff up. organize kids, and get ready to move, whether you are camping by foot or with vehicles. You will likely need to move locations after a contact with bad guys, even if you get the upper hand. Either way, pack up, provide covering fire, and bug out to an established emergency rendezvous (ERV) location. Rally, check status and move off.
A question received:
Just a few thoughts on how you may have to adapt your camping once the S has HTF.
Assuming you have bugged out somewhere and are camping, because we are talking civil breakdown and all that, we have to assume that there are potential bad guys out there. This will mean that your camping will have to take on a more tactical form. Without going into too great a detail, here are a few factors you may want to think about:
1. Location: pick a concealed location preferably without an obvious access route, allowing you observation of the approaches to your campsite. Try to not be with others, unless they are part of your group i.e. don't be at a National Park campsite. Try to conceal your location. Avoiding trouble by using concealment is the best policy.
2. Light and noise discipline. No lights at night, keep the noise and goofing off down. This means no campfire at night, lamps etc. You are not camping, you are surviving in the woods. If they see your campfire, they are coming.
3. Cooking: tied in with the light thing, you should consider getting all your cooking done in daylight and eating earlier.
4. Security: make sure you have sentries out, even if this is just a roving guard. Also, use buddies to go do tasks, such as hunting or collecting water or wood.
5. Have a 'stand to' plan for if you are bumped by bad guys. Initially the sentry will be engaging them, but the rest need to roll out, grab weapons and move to defensive positions.
6. 'Bug Out": as part of the 'stand to" plan individuals should be designated to pack stuff up. organize kids, and get ready to move, whether you are camping by foot or with vehicles. You will likely need to move locations after a contact with bad guys, even if you get the upper hand. Either way, pack up, provide covering fire, and bug out to an established emergency rendezvous (ERV) location. Rally, check status and move off.
A question received:
'How often would you recommend moving the site? Would that help at all? Or is it best to remain in one spot till you are found (suspect someone is on to you) then move?'
Answer: That is a very interesting question and will depend on the circumstances. If you do suspect that someone is 'on to you' then you should move immediately before they get a chance to attack you in place, and keep moving until the threat passes. That could also lead into other types of response: if you are genuinely in a situation where someone is after you or following you then you should consider some type of ambush (offense being best form of defense) if you have the capability in order to take the initiative away from them.
When I wrote the original post, it was more security procedures in general, not specific. If you are out there and you don't suspect you have been noticed, then there is no real limit to how long you could stay in a place. You may be really well hidden so don't move just for the sake of it. Also, the more you move, whether by foot or vehicle, the more chance that you will be picked up on someones 'radar' and perhaps followed, or walk into someone elses defensive perimeter. If you are well hunkered down, you could stay there so long as you have sentries and keep the security measures sup. Getting sloppy/complacent will get you found.
If you are not in such a backwoods situation and you suspect you may have been noticed, then you should keep moving. Maybe only one night in each place until you get to a real well hidden place. If it is sort of high risk, you are moving, you can consider stopping late afternoon at a location to cook and eat, administrate, before moving to another location prior to nightfall to establish a camp and sleep. This is a dismounted jungle warfare technique designed to throw off anyone tracking you.
When I wrote the original post, it was more security procedures in general, not specific. If you are out there and you don't suspect you have been noticed, then there is no real limit to how long you could stay in a place. You may be really well hidden so don't move just for the sake of it. Also, the more you move, whether by foot or vehicle, the more chance that you will be picked up on someones 'radar' and perhaps followed, or walk into someone elses defensive perimeter. If you are well hunkered down, you could stay there so long as you have sentries and keep the security measures sup. Getting sloppy/complacent will get you found.
If you are not in such a backwoods situation and you suspect you may have been noticed, then you should keep moving. Maybe only one night in each place until you get to a real well hidden place. If it is sort of high risk, you are moving, you can consider stopping late afternoon at a location to cook and eat, administrate, before moving to another location prior to nightfall to establish a camp and sleep. This is a dismounted jungle warfare technique designed to throw off anyone tracking you.
And further:
Re: leaving less sign at your campsite: It can be hard, particularly if you are a family group with children rather than a small spec ops team!
You have to change the idea in your mind from 'camping' to being in a 'patrol base'. This will need to take account, again, of children etc. You won't be sitting round the fire drinking a cold one. There will be no fire sometimes, if you have to go 'hard routine'. Cook during the day and if you can use propane camp stoves or similar which will not leave sign. Don't cut anything at your campsite. Dig latrines and fill them in. Pick up all trash and carry it out, sweep the area before departure and try to cover up any sign. Anyone with skill will realize that you have been there, but you can reduce signature. If you are in vehicle you may leave tracks anyway etc.
Think about rather than trying to eliminate all sign that you were there, reduce it as much as possible and then use deception, such as moving off in another direction then switching course. On the offensive side you can stop on your route and put in a 'snap ambush', breaking track to cover the trail you just walked to catch any trackers. You should do this if you are on foot and before you stop and establish a patrol base anyway.
If you are less of a family group and more of a patrol, then you should be operating under stronger battle discipline. This would entail overnighting in a concealed location with all round defense and sentries. You would only put up rain tarps after dark, after evening 'stand to' and take them down before first light and morning 'stand to'. You would do clearance patrols of the area once you had moved into it and after morning stand to. You would put in a snap ambush and use deception before moving into your night location. No fires, lights or noise. Consider the cooking and eating at a different location thing before moving into your overnight position.
Re: being random I totally agree with that for any normal activities. Consider however that if you are in a camping area in the woods etc you will want to reduce noise and sign. In a patrol position this would entail clearing a 'trackplan' around the position and stringing commo string around it, moving leaves and sticks off the path etc. This allows silent movement around the perimeter and to each sleeping area at night. It also reduces the signature of tracks and can be covered up again prior to leaving, pushing leaves and sticks back over the track plan. Rather than denuding a wide area if you are moving a short distance to collect water, you may be better off with a single track plan to do this, reducing signature in grasses and reeds etc. Obviously, if this goes beyond a short walk to a water source, to a patrol, then you will change that and avoid all pattern setting , going back to the random model.
You have to change the idea in your mind from 'camping' to being in a 'patrol base'. This will need to take account, again, of children etc. You won't be sitting round the fire drinking a cold one. There will be no fire sometimes, if you have to go 'hard routine'. Cook during the day and if you can use propane camp stoves or similar which will not leave sign. Don't cut anything at your campsite. Dig latrines and fill them in. Pick up all trash and carry it out, sweep the area before departure and try to cover up any sign. Anyone with skill will realize that you have been there, but you can reduce signature. If you are in vehicle you may leave tracks anyway etc.
Think about rather than trying to eliminate all sign that you were there, reduce it as much as possible and then use deception, such as moving off in another direction then switching course. On the offensive side you can stop on your route and put in a 'snap ambush', breaking track to cover the trail you just walked to catch any trackers. You should do this if you are on foot and before you stop and establish a patrol base anyway.
If you are less of a family group and more of a patrol, then you should be operating under stronger battle discipline. This would entail overnighting in a concealed location with all round defense and sentries. You would only put up rain tarps after dark, after evening 'stand to' and take them down before first light and morning 'stand to'. You would do clearance patrols of the area once you had moved into it and after morning stand to. You would put in a snap ambush and use deception before moving into your night location. No fires, lights or noise. Consider the cooking and eating at a different location thing before moving into your overnight position.
Re: being random I totally agree with that for any normal activities. Consider however that if you are in a camping area in the woods etc you will want to reduce noise and sign. In a patrol position this would entail clearing a 'trackplan' around the position and stringing commo string around it, moving leaves and sticks off the path etc. This allows silent movement around the perimeter and to each sleeping area at night. It also reduces the signature of tracks and can be covered up again prior to leaving, pushing leaves and sticks back over the track plan. Rather than denuding a wide area if you are moving a short distance to collect water, you may be better off with a single track plan to do this, reducing signature in grasses and reeds etc. Obviously, if this goes beyond a short walk to a water source, to a patrol, then you will change that and avoid all pattern setting , going back to the random model.
Friday, October 5, 2012
Fix Bayonets!
I was just reading the article by Mosby "Bayonets, Bloodshed, and that Bastard, Reality…..":
Mosby on Bayonet Fighting Here
I really enjoyed it, good article. A link to the story of the recent British Army bayonet charge in Helmand Province is here:
Telegraph Article on the Recent British Bayonet Charge
Mosby mentions: "If bayonet training was taught that way, and combined with pugil stick pummeling, and some boxing “milling” training (as they call it in the British Army), to build physical courage and aggressiveness, it would probably (maybe) have some actual value."
When I was in the British Army, in the Parachute Regiment, it was only The Parachute Regiment and broadly Airborne Forces that still retained 'milling'. It was institutionalized as part of pre-parachute selection (Pegasus or 'P' Company). In that format, it was one minute with 16oz gloves, straight punching your opponent. You were not allowed to box or defend yourself and the idea was to develop, and select for, aggression. Can you keep your head up and deal it out while receiving it in equal measure? This was combined with other aspects (there were 10 'events' total on 'test week') on P Company that were not purely physical, such as the 'Trainasium", designed by psychologists, which incorporated heights to check on the ability to respond to orders while experienceing fear. All to select and train paratroopers.
But then again, The Parachute Regiment was the only organization to retain 'The Shell' (or 'being put on the shell') as a form of discipline to avoid the official disciplinary process. Progress was deferred to by re-classifying 'the shell' as extra PT, rather than a form of punishment, and helmets were to be worn while doing it, for safety.
But I really wanted to add something about the whole bayonet thing. It is the psychological factor that is often overlooked. Clearly, bayonets were a lot more useful when you had a muzzle loading musket or rifle and had to fight with something, particularly when the enemy was likely to have edged weapons too. So what relevance on a modern battlefield with rapid firing automatic weapons and endless rapid magazine reloads? Clearly you are not going to forgo the opportunity to shoot a man in order to try and close with him and bayonet him? Perhaps you have run out of ammo?
Mosby on Bayonet Fighting Here
I really enjoyed it, good article. A link to the story of the recent British Army bayonet charge in Helmand Province is here:
Telegraph Article on the Recent British Bayonet Charge
Mosby mentions: "If bayonet training was taught that way, and combined with pugil stick pummeling, and some boxing “milling” training (as they call it in the British Army), to build physical courage and aggressiveness, it would probably (maybe) have some actual value."
When I was in the British Army, in the Parachute Regiment, it was only The Parachute Regiment and broadly Airborne Forces that still retained 'milling'. It was institutionalized as part of pre-parachute selection (Pegasus or 'P' Company). In that format, it was one minute with 16oz gloves, straight punching your opponent. You were not allowed to box or defend yourself and the idea was to develop, and select for, aggression. Can you keep your head up and deal it out while receiving it in equal measure? This was combined with other aspects (there were 10 'events' total on 'test week') on P Company that were not purely physical, such as the 'Trainasium", designed by psychologists, which incorporated heights to check on the ability to respond to orders while experienceing fear. All to select and train paratroopers.
But then again, The Parachute Regiment was the only organization to retain 'The Shell' (or 'being put on the shell') as a form of discipline to avoid the official disciplinary process. Progress was deferred to by re-classifying 'the shell' as extra PT, rather than a form of punishment, and helmets were to be worn while doing it, for safety.
But I really wanted to add something about the whole bayonet thing. It is the psychological factor that is often overlooked. Clearly, bayonets were a lot more useful when you had a muzzle loading musket or rifle and had to fight with something, particularly when the enemy was likely to have edged weapons too. So what relevance on a modern battlefield with rapid firing automatic weapons and endless rapid magazine reloads? Clearly you are not going to forgo the opportunity to shoot a man in order to try and close with him and bayonet him? Perhaps you have run out of ammo?
If you have the capability to utilize bayonets on your assault weapons, then do not underestimate it. If used in thr assault, bayonets should be fixed in the FUP (Forming Up Point) as a ritual prior to crossing the line of departure. Once in the FUP the leader will look left and right at the line, draw his bayonet and hold it up prior to fitting it to his rifle; the assaulting riflemen will follow suit. Statistics from wars show that actual numbers of deaths and wounds from bayonetting are very low. However, the secret to this is that the enemy will usually break and flee if they see you forming up to assault with the bayonet. The great thing about bayonets is that if you fix them and begin to prosecute an attack, you will likely not get close enough to actually have to use it because the enemy will flee. That is the secret of the bayonet. Bayonet training is usually conducted as an activity all on its own. It is a form of conditioning in savagery. Recruits will undergo a bayonet assault course which will be as muddy and horrific as possible, preferably utilizing any actual animal blood and guts you can get hold of. The recruits will run the assault course under a barrage of abuse from the instructors, with as many battle simulation explosions as possible. They will be crawling under wire and over obstacles and through mud. Think “tough mudder” with bayonets. They will have to assault and stab both hanging and prone realistic dummies as they go, while preferably having to crawl through actual animal guts and have those guts hanging out of the dummies. Horrific, extremely tiring, great fun and training value! Gurkhas from Nepal, who have served the British Army faithfully as mercenaries for centuries, do not use bayonets: They have their traditional curved and wicked kukri on their belts and will charge with extreme ferocity when in close contact with the enemy. This does not advocate the use of mechanical weapons over the use of your assault weapon or backup handgun at close range, but it’s something to think about in sowing fear amongst your enemies. The Native Americans back in the Revolutionary period utilized standoff weapons such as bows and muskets/rifles but I am sure their adversaries such as the British redcoats and the French had nightmares about a close range assault with a tomahawk?
Just some thoughts....
Edit: @ Disciple of Night's comment:
Elaborating: sure, let me get some thoughts together and do that soon. Briefly, fixing bayonets, unless it has changed, used to be standard with British infantry in any kind of assault mode. The idea was to: 'close with and destroy the enemy with bullet, bomb and bayonet'. The Falklands war was pretty old school in that bayonet assaults took place once the Paras got into the enemy positions. The way it was taught for infantry assault onto a defended position such as a trench or bunker was for a grenade to be 'posted' in and then the assault man would follow up by jumping or crawling into the bunker and finishing off anyone using either rifle fire and ultimatelyy the bayonet if it got that way.
Edit: @ Disciple of Night's comment:
Elaborating: sure, let me get some thoughts together and do that soon. Briefly, fixing bayonets, unless it has changed, used to be standard with British infantry in any kind of assault mode. The idea was to: 'close with and destroy the enemy with bullet, bomb and bayonet'. The Falklands war was pretty old school in that bayonet assaults took place once the Paras got into the enemy positions. The way it was taught for infantry assault onto a defended position such as a trench or bunker was for a grenade to be 'posted' in and then the assault man would follow up by jumping or crawling into the bunker and finishing off anyone using either rifle fire and ultimatelyy the bayonet if it got that way.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)